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EXPERTISE AND OPINION ASSIGNMENT ON THE
COURTS OF APPEALS: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
Jonathan Remy Nash*
Abstract
This Article examines the role of expertise in judicial opinion
assignment and offers four contributions: First, this Article develops a
general theory of opinion assignment on multimember courts. Second,
this Article uses that theory to predict how expertise might influence
opinion assignment. Third, because the theory advanced in this Article
suggests that the courts of appeals are far more likely to witness
experience-based opinion assignment than is the Supreme Court, this
Article contributes to an understanding of opinion assignment practices
in this understudied area. Fourth, this Article identifies two settings in
which the theory this Article advances should have observable
implications, and this Article proceeds to test those implications
empirically. It finds that, in the years following the initial adoption of
the Sentencing Guidelines, circuit judges who were Sentencing
Commissioners were more likely to have assigned to them opinions
raising sentencing issues. It also finds that circuit judges who previously
served as bankruptcy judges were more likely to have bankruptcy cases
assigned to them. The Guidelines setting, moreover, allows for a natural
experiment, in that we can test whether judges who served as
Commissioners saw disproportionate levels of opinion assignment in
criminal cases before the Guidelines took effect; it turns out, consistent
with the theory, that they did not.
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INTRODUCTION
Commentators generally accept that, notwithstanding the norm of
equalizing workload among judges on multimember courts,1 it is at least
sometimes the case that some judges will tend to write more opinions in
particular subject matter areas than others. Yet the assignment of
opinions on the basis of expertise, especially on the federal courts of
appeals, is undertheorized and understudied. The existing literature is
lacking in several ways.
First, the existing literature falls short on offering a clear
conceptualization of judicial expertise. In particular, it often fails to
distinguish clearly between, and indeed often conflates, “expertise” and
“opinion specialization.”2 In fact, the two concepts are quite different:3
Expertise is the product of training and experience. While expertise
conceivably might result from the continued writing of judicial opinions
in an area, it is much more likely to have arisen by virtue of some
experience the judge enjoyed before joining the court (or extrajudicial
experience engaged in during judicial service). In short, expertise puts a
judge at a comparative advantage to draft an opinion because the other
judges on the court are unlikely to have it.4
1. Commentators acknowledge the strength of this norm. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 367–68
(2002); FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL
GAME 37 (2000). Sometimes the attempt to equalize workloads goes beyond simple case
numbers to other attributes, such as case difficulty. See, e.g., JUDITH A. MCKENNA ET AL., FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 18 (2000)
(“Some courts have their staffs try to distribute cases across panels to equalize judicial
workloads, either based on staff assessments of case difficulty or according to case type to give
each panel a range of matters.”); MALTZMAN ET AL., supra, at 22 (noting the importance of case
difficulty on workloads). Judge Posner explains that “the Supreme Court is more flexible than
the courts of appeals” with respect to the equal workload norm. RICHARD A. POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 124 (1995).
2. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 378–81; David Klein & Darby Morrisroe,
The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL
STUD. 371, 382 (1999) (studying prestige and influence of judges, and noting that “there is no
reason why prestige should not derive from expertise” (emphasis added)).
3. See Isaac Unah & Christopher Wall, The Effects of Subject-Matter Expertise in the
U.S. Supreme Court 9–10 (Apr. 1–3, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(critiquing this approach). Unah & Wall’s paper is an exception in this regard.
4. In one of the settings examined in this Article, two circuit judges served as
Commissioners of the United States Sentencing Commission when that Commission drafted the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Although these judges served as Commissioners
contemporaneously while serving as circuit judges, their understanding of the Guidelines was
something other circuit judges were unlikely to have. In the other setting, several circuit judges
served as federal bankruptcy judges before being elevated to the circuit. Once again, the
understanding these judges had of bankruptcy law and litigation was unlikely to be shared by
other judges on the circuit court.
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An opinion assignor might assign opinions in a subject area to
someone not because the assignee has any expertise, but because he
enjoys working in that subject area.5 Conversely, a judge might find
himself the recipient of numerous opinion assignments in an area if it is
an opinion area that no judge on the court likes6 or if the assignor does
not like him.7 Political scientists Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth
suggest that “[t]o characterize such justices as specialists seems a
misnomer.”8 However, they do not explain how to identify issue
specialization when it does occur. Further, their tests for specialization
focus, nonetheless, on the frequency with which Justices author
opinions in particular areas.9
Like Segal and Spaeth, many other commentators also test for issue
specialization simply by looking at the frequency with which a judge
writes opinions in particular areas.10 Even stranger than this is the
approach taken by Professors Forrest Maltzman, James Spriggs, and
Paul Wahlbeck: While they hypothesize that a judge’s expertise may
lead to greater opinion assignment in that area,11 curiously, they
measure “expertise” by reference to the number of cases in which a
5. Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Issue Specialization in Majority Opinion
Assignment on the Burger Court, 39 W. POL. Q. 520, 520 (1986).
6. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, Of Crud and Dogs: An Updated Collection of Quotations in
Support of the Proposition that the Supreme Court Does Not Devote the Greatest Care and
Attention to Our Exciting Area of the Law; or Something the Tax Notes Editors Might Use to
Fill Up a Little Space in That Odd Week when Calvin Johnson Has Nothing to Print, 58 TAX
NOTES 1257 (1993).
7. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 378 (“Given the norm of equal
distribution and assigners’ policy preferences, it makes perfect sense to assign unattractive cases
to one’s ideological opponents.”); BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN:
INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 190 (1979) (noting that Justice Blackmun “felt that he had
suffered” under Chief Justice Burger’s reign, in part by virtue of having received “more than his
share of tax . . . cases”).
8. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 379.
9. See id. at 379–80; see also JONATHAN MATTHEW COHEN, INSIDE APPELLATE COURTS:
THE IMPACT OF COURT ORGANIZATION ON JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS 48–49 (2002) (noting that expertise can arise from prior experience and
from drafting opinions in an area); Saul Brenner, Issue Specialization as a Variable in Opinion
Assignment on the U.S. Supreme Court, 46 J. POL. 1217, 1218 (1984) (noting that, while “[i]t is
not unreasonable to assume that a justice” who is assigned a disproportionate number of
opinions in an area “might have been selected because he possessed special expertise on that
issue or that the experience of writing numerous opinions facilitates the development of
expertise,” “the conclusions of this investigation are not dependent upon either of these two
assumptions”).
10. See, e.g., Burton M. Atkins, Opinion Assignments on the United States Courts of
Appeals: The Question of Issue Specialization, 27 W. POL. Q. 409, 409 (1974); Brenner, supra
note 9, at 1218; Brenner & Spaeth, supra note 5, at 520; Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the
Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 519 (2008).
11. See MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 38.
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Justice wrote a dissent or concurrence in a particular area.12 Measures of
specialization such as these may capture some opinion assignment
based on actual expertise. It may also be the case, however, that over
time, opinion specialization begets expertise.13 But a judge well may
have developed an expertise before ascending to the bench or, as this
Article will point out, may develop an expertise while serving as a judge
but while engaging in nonjudicial activities. Measuring specialization
will capture this, but it will also capture (i) the “early days” of
specialization that might one day generate expertise, (ii) judges’
preference to write opinions in an area bearing no relationship to any
expertise, and (iii) areas in which judges disfavored by assignors are
compelled to write opinions.
A second shortcoming of most of the extant opinion assignment
literature is that it examines only the Supreme Court. Only three
commentators have looked at court of appeals opinion assignment
practices with respect to specialization, let alone expertise.14 The focus
on the Supreme Court misses the vast bulk of cases handled by the
courts of appeals that never reach the Court.15
Third, the limits of the existing research have stunted efforts to
theorize about the causal mechanisms that might motivate opinion
assignments to experts in a field. To be sure, commentators have noted
12. See id. at 43–44.
13. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 379 (“[S]pecialization may facilitate the
development of judicial expertise . . . .”); Brenner, supra note 9, at 1218 (“It is not unreasonable
to assume that . . . the experience of writing numerous opinions facilitates the development of
expertise.”). The extent to which this is the case likely varies with both the accessibility of the
area of law and also with the judicial structure. Professor Isaac Unah argues that specialized
courts (such as the Federal Circuit) provide their judges with an opportunity to develop
expertise:
[T]hese judges gain substantive expertise over time by serving in a court that
concentrates its decision making on a small set of statutorily defined policy
niches. This narrow focus in turn engenders for the judges a kind of task
repetitiveness and repeated exposure to congruent case stimuli that is absent in
traditional courts. Because of this defining feature of specialized courts, judges
are able to learn quickly and to adapt to their tasks by “thinking by doing.” This
allows specialized court judges to anticipate problems and design solutions
even before the problems are brought to court.
Isaac Unah, Specialized Courts of Appeals’ Review of Bureaucratic Actions and the Politics of
Protectionism, 50 POL. RES. Q. 851, 858 (1997).
14. See J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 250–55 (1981) (finding sporadic evidence of specialization on three circuits); Atkins,
supra note 10, at 409–10 (finding evidence of opinion specialization on the courts of appeals);
Cheng, supra note 10, at 540, 548 (finding considerable evidence of specialization).
15. See Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 265 (2006) (noting
the general problem of deriving too many lessons from studies focused on the Supreme Court).
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in passing the efficiency benefits that specialization—with expertise—
offers.16 However, they have not endeavored to explain with any
precision exactly when, and to what extent expertise will influence
opinion assignment. Professors Jeffrey Lax and Charles Cameron
laudably elucidate that expertise should factor into the calculus of the
costs of opinion writing.17 In the end, however, they—like Professor
Saul Brenner,18 Segal and Spaeth—present expertise as an adjunct to
ideology, as something that might play a marginal role in choosing an
assignee among judges already in a majority coalition.19 Part of the
problem here is the second shortcoming noted above—the almost
complete failure of scholars to look beyond the Supreme Court. To the
extent that courts of appeals are more constrained by law and less free
to act attitudinally,20 perhaps the theories, and hence the findings,
applicable to the Supreme Court do not extend well to the courts of
appeals.21
Fourth, as a result of the general failure to offer a systematic theory
of the role of expertise in judicial opinion assignment, commentators
often do not formulate predictive hypotheses or draw useful conclusions
with regard to expertise. Expertise is unscientifically discovered after
the fact as an explanation for cherry-picked observations. Dr. Burton
Atkins, Professor W.J. Howard, Jr., and Professor Edward Cheng
identify areas of specialization of various circuit judges, but they
identify them based upon the disproportionate number of opinions the
judges draft. The perceived expertise is a result of opinion assignments,
rather than the impetus for opinion assignments.22 For example, only
after discovering that Judge Wilkins wrote “an overwhelming number”
of criminal case opinions does Professor Cheng proffer the
explanation—nowhere previously hypothesized—that Judge Wilkins
“was chairman of the United States Sentencing Commission.”23 Years
16. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 10, at 524–25.
17. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Charles M. Cameron, Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on
the US Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 276, 282 (2007).
18. See Brenner, supra note 9, at 1221 (“[T]his study has shown that Warren tended to
select as issue specialists justices who had the same or similar ideological views as himself.”).
19. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 372–73, 378–79.
20. See Friedman, supra note 15, at 265.
21. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 529–30; see also POSNER, supra note 1, at 143–44
(arguing that Supreme Court Justices may work harder per case than a court of appeals judge).
22. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 10, at 541 (noting amorphously that “many of the specific
instances of specialization make intuitive sense based on the judges’ backgrounds”).
23. Id.; see also id. at 542 (noting that expertise “easily explains the three greatest
instances of specialization” on the D.C. Circuit). Cheng also suggests that Judge Wilkins’s
experience as a United States Sentencing Commissioner helps to explain the disproportionate
number of opinions in postconviction challenges that he wrote. See id. at 541. It is unclear why
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earlier, both Professor Atkins and Professor Howard offered similar
after-the-fact, experience-based justifications for a small fraction of
their specialization findings.24
This Article seeks to fill some of these gaps in the existing literature.
First, this Article develops a general theory of opinion assignment on
multimember courts. Second, this Article uses that theory to predict
how expertise might influence opinion assignment. Third, in elucidating
this theory, this Article introduces a factor besides efficiency that might
motivate experience-based opinion assignment: the enhanced reputation
of the judge and the court on which he or she sits. Fourth, this Article
identifies settings in which the theory this Article advances should have
observable implications, and then proceeds to test those implications.
Fifth, because the theory this Article describes suggests that the courts
of appeals are far more likely to witness experience-based opinion
assignment than is the Supreme Court, this Article contributes to
research on opinion assignment practices in this understudied area.
This Article tests the theory of expertise-driven opinion assignment
in two different settings using original datasets. The first setting is the
assignment of cases under the United States Sentencing Guidelines on
court of appeals panels that included judges who served as
Commissioners on the Sentencing Commission that drafted the
Guidelines: Judge William W. Wilkins, Jr., of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, who served as the first Commission
Chair; and Judge (later Justice) Stephen Breyer of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit who served as a Commissioner.25
The Sentencing Guidelines provide a felicitous setting in which to study
opinion assignment. The introduction of the Guidelines in late 1987
provided an exogenous shock to the federal criminal legal landscape.
No judges had experience applying the Guidelines. A few judges,
however, had served on the Sentencing Commission that drafted the
Guidelines at Congress’s behest. Judge Wilkins served as the original
Chair of the Commission. He held that position when the original
this would be so, since (i) virtually all of these would have been challenges to underlying state
law convictions, and (ii) almost all the claims raised would have been constitutional in nature.
24. See Atkins, supra note 10, at 417 (discussing Second Circuit Judge Hays’s
specialization in labor cases); id. at 418 & n.16 (discussing Fourth Circuit Chief Judge
Sobeloff’s specialization in racial, criminal due process, and labor relations cases); HOWARD,
supra note 14, at 253 (“Exploiting his expertise in admiralty, [Fifth Circuit Judge] Brown alone
wrote 75 percent of the opinions when eligible in marine personal injuries.”).
25. Former Commissioner Information, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, http://www.ussc.gov/
About_the_Commission/About_the_Commissioners/Former_Commissioners.cfm (last visited
Aug. 25, 2014).
I refer in the text to “Judge Breyer” rather than “Justice Breyer” when referring to the time
period of the study.
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Guidelines were drafted and promulgated, and he remained in the role
for the first few years of the Guidelines’ applicability, through 1994.26
Judge Breyer served as Commissioner from 1985 to 1989. For at least
the first few years of the Guidelines’ applicability, then, Judge Wilkins
and Judge Breyer had what almost no other judges,27 even fewer other
appellate judges, and no other judge on the Fourth or First Circuits,
had—expertise with the Sentencing Guidelines. Moreover, that
expertise would have had no bearing in terms of cases, and therefore
opinion assignments, before the advent of the Guidelines. The
prediction is that their expertise led to Guidelines cases being assigned
to them at higher rates than normal. The data generally validate this
prediction.
The Guidelines setting is also felicitous in that it allows for a
valuable natural experiment. Expertise with the Guidelines became
useful only once the Guidelines took effect. But the Guidelines became
effective while the judges in question were already on the bench. Thus,
the Guidelines setting provides a rare example of an expertise that,
because of an exogenous shock, became useful while the judges were
already members of the judiciary. This allows us to examine opinion
assignment in criminal cases both before and after the expertise became
valuable. If the disproportionate opinion assignment observed after the
Guidelines became effective were an artifact of something other than
the judges’ expertise—for example, perhaps the judges had an affinity
for criminal law cases—then we should observe similar
disproportionate opinion assignment in criminal cases before the
Guidelines took effect. On the other hand, if expertise is really driving
the result after the Guidelines became effective, then we should not
observe disproportionate opinion assignment before the Guidelines took
effect. In the end, consistent with the expertise theory, the data reviewed
in this Article reveal no disproportionate opinion assignment before the
Guidelines became effective.
The other setting in which this Article tests the theory is the
assignment of bankruptcy cases on court of appeals panels that included
judges who previously served as federal bankruptcy judges. Bankruptcy
cases provide a useful setting in which to study opinion assignment.
Bankruptcy law is complex and technical, and has not been found to
invite substantial ideological voting. Moreover, very few circuit judges
26. See David M. Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy: Learning Lessons
from Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines Era, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2 n.1 (2008)
(noting Judge Wilkins’s appointment and tenure).
27. One other federal judge was among the initial appointments to the Sentencing
Commission: George E. MacKinnon, a senior judge of the District of Columbia Circuit, serving
from 1985 to 1991. See Former Commissioner Information, supra note 25.
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could offer the expertise one can obtain only from prior service as a
bankruptcy judge.
This Article makes four broad contributions through its analysis.
First, it offers a theory of the role of expertise in opinion assignment.
Second, it offers empirical evidence in support of aspects of the theory.
Third, it operates on a nuanced understanding of expertise rather than,
as other studies have approached the subject, on the extent of past
opinion writing in an area. Fourth, it offers empirical evidence, in two
settings, of expertise-based opinion assignment.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I offers a utility-based model
of opinion assignment. Part II then relies upon that model to derive an
understanding of how expertise might influence opinion assignment.
Part III describes the two settings in which this Article looks for
observed implications of that theory. It looks at the assignment of
federal criminal appeals and Sentencing Guidelines appeals to circuit
judges who worked as Commissioners on the Sentencing Commission
that drafted the Guidelines. It also looks at the assignment of
bankruptcy appeals to circuit judges with prior experience as federal
bankruptcy judges. Part IV describes the empirical data that this Article
gathered and the analysis that this Article undertakes to test the theory
advanced in Part I. Part V discusses the results and suggests some
implications.
I. A UTILITY-BASED MODEL OF OPINION ASSIGNMENT
This Part offers a utility-based model of opinion assignment (a more
formal model appears in Appendix A) and begins by considering courts
in general, with no restriction on the type of case before the court. This
Part highlights three factors—the time it takes to draft an opinion, the
legal value of the opinion, and the ideological value of the opinion—
that assigning judges are likely to consider in making opinion
assignments. This Article then refines the model by considering settings
involving particular types of courts hearing particular types of cases
where the last factor, ideology, is less likely to play a role.
This Article assumes that, in every case, court rules allocate to a
judge on the panel hearing the case28 the power to assign to one
member29 of the majority coalition for disposition of the case
28. This is almost always, but not universally, the case. See infra note 86 and
accompanying text (noting one source that asserts that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit at one point employed a random method for opinion assignments, and another that
asserts that some assigning judges rely at least in part on random distribution).
29. It is possible that multiple judges will share opinion-writing responsibility. E.g.,
Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 669 & n.* (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (noting that, while the
opinion was filed “PER CURIAM,” “Judge Williams wrote Parts I.B–C and II.B; Judge Sentelle
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(including, possibly, the judge with the assignment power)
responsibility to draft the opinion in the case.30 The only assumed
restriction on assigning opinions to judges is the expectation that each
judge will draft roughly the same number of opinions.31
An assigning judge will select an assignee judge with an eye to the
utility that the opinion drafted by that judge will provide. An opinion
will vary (depending on which judge authored it) in the costs and
benefits it offers in terms of (i) the effort it takes the authoring judge to
prepare the opinion (“opinion effort”), (ii) legal legitimacy and
reputation (“legal value”), and (iii) ideological legitimacy and
reputation (“ideological value”). Assigning judges will estimate their
utility from some combination of these factors and also from the
reaction of the assigning judges’ colleagues (including the assignee32) to
the choice of assignee. Each assigning judge presumably weights the
factors differently.
One would expect assigning judges—and indeed all judges on the
court—to have homogenous views on two of the factors: opinion effort
and legal value. Whether because the court’s interest and the judges’
wrote Parts I.A, II.A, II.C, and III.A; Judge Rogers wrote Parts III.B and IV”). Moreover, even
if one judge bears primary responsibility for an opinion, other judges who have heard the case
(and perhaps even other judges on the court who have not heard the case) may have input into
the opinion. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for
Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 124 (2003). Still, the simplifying assumption of a
single author is justified insofar as in most cases a single judge will have primary opinionwriting responsibility, and that judge will contribute far more work than any other judges to the
final majority opinion.
30. This assumption places the assignment of opinion-drafting responsibility squarely
within the court’s policy, rather than purely dispositional, function. See Charles M. Cameron &
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts (3): Adjudication Equilibria 5–6 (N.Y. Univ.
Pub. Law & Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 09-39, 2009) (distinguishing between a
court’s dispositional and its policy preferences and functions). Recent scholarship confirms the
importance of policy outcomes to judges and courts. See Deborah Beim et al., Policy and
Disposition Coalitions on the Supreme Court of the United States 1 (Oct. 23, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=16
41542.
31. This is a simplifying assumption. The norm of parity may sometimes call for rough
equality of workload, not precise numbers of opinions. Thus, for example, one judge might
receive fewer opinion assignments than another judge if the cases for which the first judge
receives assignments are more complicated than those for which the second judge receives
assignments. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 9, at 72 (explaining the practice on the Ninth Circuit
of weighting cases by number of issues raised and then assigning fewer cases with more issues
to panels). This Article assumes that either the norm calls for rough equality in numbers of
assignments, or more or less equally, that in the long run numbers of cases represent a rough
proxy for workload.
32. A judge could be pleased with receiving the opinion assignment in the case, or she
might prefer if another judge had been assigned the task. See supra text accompanying notes 5–
6.
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interests align with the general interest of the court, or even if only out
of their fiduciary responsibilities, one would expect assigning judges to
prefer, all else equal, to minimize the depletion of resources imposed by
the time and effort it takes to prepare the opinion.33
For similar reasons, one would expect assigning judges—and judges
on the court in general—to seek, all else equal, to maximize legal value
benefits.34 These benefits offer the judges the opportunity to establish,
or build upon, the perception—among other judges, the legal
community, the other branches of government, and the public-atlarge—that the court is worthy of the powers vested in it and that it
makes just, law-based decisions.35 They also may enhance the court’s
and the judges’ reputation for legal quality.36 Legal reputation benefits
33. See COHEN, supra note 9, at 5–6 (recognizing the pressures that time constraints
impose on courts of appeals). The idea that courts have limited resources is consistent with the
notion that courts have external limitations on resources. See Matt Spitzer & Eric Talley,
Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649, 654 n.15 (2000) (discussing judicial auditing costs,
and noting that at the least they constitute opportunity costs to the reviewing court); Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and Precedent in a
Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1610 (1995) (discussing the assumption of resource
constraint on courts). But the idea that courts have limited resources may also be consistent with
the notion that judges simply choose to limit their input in order to maximize their own leisure.
See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody
Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 11, 20–21 (1993).
34. While one can conceive of an opinion that affirmatively detracts from legal
legitimacy—say, if the opinion stated bluntly that ideological ends justified an outcome
notwithstanding legal precedent—this Article assumes that norms and institutional constraints
governing judicial behavior virtually eliminate such circumstances. See Kornhauser, supra note
33, at 1606 (taking as a baseline assumption in developing the economic theory of stare decisis
that “the ‘judicial team’ seeks to maximize the expected number of ‘correct’ answers subject to
its resource constraint”); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739,
746–47 (1982) (discussing how judges belong to an “interpretive community” that subscribes to
the rule of law).
35. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in
Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1055–56 (1995)
(explaining that self-respect and the respect of others are important motivating stimuli for judges
and “[j]udges generally gain respect from a craft orientation” that “preserves consistency and
predictability in the law”); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1729–32, 1747–50 (1997) (positing, and finding empirical
evidence, that circuit judges are less likely to vote ideologically in statutory administrative cases
than procedural ones, whether because Supreme Court review of the former type of case is more
likely or because the legal standards for procedural challenges are more malleable than for
statutory challenges); Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and Judicial
Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 973 (2009) (noting that it is well established that “the Court
has an incentive to protect its institutional legitimacy by avoiding institutional confrontations
and acts on that incentive”). For discussion of legitimacy in the context of expertise, see infra
Subsection II.A.2.
36. See Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE
107, 129–30 (1983) (explaining that judges seek prestige from lawyers and litigants who appear
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may be especially useful if a court seeks to have other courts assess its
own legal abilities more favorably.
Assigning judges—and judges generally—are likely to have far
more heterogeneous views on ideological value. Whether a judge
derives benefit or suffers cost from having a choice of assignee depends
upon whether the judge’s and assignee’s ideologies align.37
In sum, if two of the relevant factors—opinion effort and legal
value—dominate, then one would expect the choice of assignee to
remain fairly constant across assignor judges. The next two Sections
identify particular types of cases, and then courts, for which this is
likely to be the case.
A. Opinion Assignment and Case Type
Consider two broad categories of cases: cases in ideologically
charged subject-matter areas that raise politically salient issues,38 and
cases in areas—often areas governed by complex codes39—that are
largely lacking in ideological controversy that do not raise salient
issues.40 (This Article refers to the latter, if somewhat imprecisely, as
before them); cf. POSNER, supra note 1, at 141 (noting that, in general, a “more talented judge is
more likely to obtain a greater reputation”). For discussion of reputation in the context of
expertise, see infra Subsection II.A.3.
37. Assuming there is alignment, a judge might appreciate the opportunity to ensconce an
ideologically satisfactory holding in a case. Cf. Revesz, supra note 35, at 1747–50 (finding
empirical evidence of ideological voting on the D.C. Circuit in certain types of cases). If enough
judges on the court are of like ideological mind, there might be seen a benefit in establishing a
general ideological reputation for the court.
38. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A
Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 309–10 (2004) (noting that some areas of law
“by general agreement, are ideologically contested,” while suggesting that other areas involve
cases that are “apparently nonideological”); cf. Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., The Dynamics and
Determinants of Agenda Change in the Rehnquist Court, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 251, 252
(Lee Epstein ed., 1995) (distinguishing between cases of low interest heard by the Court out of
duty to resolve lower court conflicts, and cases of high interest heard because of subject matter);
Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme Court
Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162, 171, 183 (1999) (discussing
Pacelle’s analysis of high- and low-interest cases that are separated by subject matter lines).
39. This is not to say that highly technical areas are devoid of ideology (nor to say that
ideologically charged areas are uncomplicated). See, e.g., Banks Miller & Brett Curry,
Expertise, Experience, and Ideology on Specialized Courts: The Case of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 839, 842 (2009) (showing that judicial decisionmaking in patent law cases on the Federal Circuit “can be ideological”). The point is only that,
all else equal, greater legal complexity may tend to mute ideological tendencies.
40. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 126, 136 (2013)
(discussing low-ideology cases); Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Does Ideology Matter
in Bankruptcy? Voting Behavior on the Courts of Appeals, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919, 919
(2012) (finding no evidence of ideological voting among circuit judges in bankruptcy cases
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“nonideological cases.”) Cases in the first category are likely to produce
values of the various weighting factors that vary greatly across judges.
Ideologically minded judges will be likely to weight the ideological
value factor highly—although whether a judge weights these factors
positively or negatively will depend upon whether the judge is of like,
or opposite, ideology to the authoring judge. Also, there may be judges
who tend to be less ideological and tend to believe that cases (even
ideologically charged ones) ought to be decided in accord with the rule
of law. These judges may assign comparatively little weight to
ideological value and instead may give more weight to legal value.
These differences will, in turn, also feed vastly different utilities for the
other judges on the court as to the assignee choice.
In contrast, one can rationally expect the weighting of factors to be
more uniform across judges with respect to cases that fall within the
second category—i.e., cases in nonideological areas that do not raise
salient issues. Here, even ideological judges are likely to weight
ideological value far less than they do legal value. Indeed, even if
judges disagree as to the outcome that “the law” dictates or suggests,
they are likely to agree that the case should be decided in accordance
with governing law.
B. Opinion Assignment and Court Type
Just as case type may affect the weights judges assign to the various
factors, court type may have a similar effect. Let us consider two types
of courts. One is a court that understands its mission as, and devotes
considerable resources to, correcting errors made by courts below. The
other is a court that understands its mission in large part as identifying
and resolving controversial and divisive issues. These two case types
have representatives in most U.S. jurisdictions: for example, the federal
courts of appeals are largely error-correcting courts, while the Supreme
Court is a paradigmatic agenda-setting court.41 This Section argues that
several institutional features that typically distinguish error-correcting
courts from agenda-setting courts make error-correcting courts much
more likely to be more concerned with legal values and less concerned
with ideology than agenda-setting courts.
involving discharges of debt). But see Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Rethinking the
Principal-Agent Theory of Judging, 99 IOWA L. REV. 331, 347 (2013) [hereinafter PrincipalAgent Theory] (finding evidence of ideological voting by circuit judges in a subset of debt
dischargeability cases).
41. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Workways of the Supreme Court, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
517, 517 (2003) (“For correction of errors made in particular cases, we rely largely on the
federal courts of appeals . . . . For the most part, the Supreme Court will consider for review
only cases presenting what we call deep splits—questions on which other courts . . . have
strongly disagreed.”).
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1. Whether the Court Selects the Cases It Hears
An agenda-setting court, such as the U.S. Supreme Court, is more
likely to select the cases that it wishes to decide. This leaves such a
court free to focus on cases that raise issues that are most pressing and
important to society. The odds are that many such cases will be
ideologically divisive, with error correction being displaced.42
In contrast, an error-correcting court is usually one that hears cases
where litigants have a right of appeal. As such, one might expect that
many of the cases that reach such a court will be more straightforward
and less ideologically divisive. It is also likely that such a court will
have a larger number of cases on its docket.
2. Whether the Court Hears Most Cases in Panels
An agenda-setting court is more likely to hear cases en banc (or at
least in panels that include comparatively larger numbers of the total
complement of judges).43 This means that opinion assignment is likely
to vest in the same judges repeatedly. Moreover, insofar as the assigning
judge will always hail from the majority coalition, the subset of
assigning judges is likely to be much smaller than it would be on courts
that hear a substantial number of cases in panels. For example, Segal
and Spaeth found that the Chief Justice assigned the vast majority of
cases, with the senior-most Associate Justice assigning a much smaller,
but still the next largest, chunk after that.44
In contrast, a court that hears a substantial number of cases in panels
is more likely to have more of its judges assigning opinions,45 to the
extent that only a judge on the panel has at least some of that

42. See id.; Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging
Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 272 (2006)
(arguing that the Court eschews error correction in favor of resolving conflicts and settling
issues of national importance); see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 8 (noting that cases
that reach the Supreme Court tend to be ideologically charged and legally indeterminate); cf. id.
at 168, 181–82 (presenting evidence that courts of appeals generally behave less ideologically
than does the Supreme Court).
43. See Charles M. Cameron & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Appeals Mechanisms, Litigant
Selection, and the Structure of Judicial Hierarchies, in INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT 173, 178, 191 (James R. Rogers et al. eds., 2006).
44. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 361–62; accord Forrest Maltzman & Paul J.
Wahlbeck, May It Please the Chief? Opinion Assignments in the Rehnquist Court, 40 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 421, 429 (1996) (finding that Chief Justice Rehnquist was in the majority, and
therefore assigned the opinion, in 316 of 398 cases argued during the 1987–1989 Terms of
Court).
45. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 528–30 (noting that the Supreme Court has an “arguably
more top-down assignment process” than do the federal courts of appeals).
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authority.46 The rotation of panel membership necessarily dilutes the
chief judge’s assignment power.47 The fact that some judges who
sometimes are responsible for assigning opinions are other times on the
receiving end48 may chasten at least some from overemphasizing
ideology in opinion assignment.
3. Whether the Court Regularly Decides Cases Unanimously
To the extent that (as described above) an agenda-setting court hears
more ideologically divisive cases and staffs more judges on typical
appeals, one would expect the judges to disagree more on the proper
rule and resolution in each case. Thus, one would expect more
concurrences and dissents.49 This may mean that ideology may trump
expertise in selecting the opinion author.
One would expect more unanimous decisions on error-correcting
courts. That will mean that ideology is more likely to take a back seat to
legal considerations in terms of opinion assignment.50 Indeed, the
collegiality that unanimous decision-making fosters51 may spread
beyond pure cases of error correction to more inherently ideological
cases.
4. How the Court’s Chief Judge Is Selected
Another institutional feature that varies with whether a court is
predominantly error correcting or agenda setting—and that affects the
likely weighting of legal value—is the method of selection of the chief
judge of the court (to the extent that the chief judge handles opinion
assignments). Commentators have noted that chief judges may have an
impact on the ideology of the courts they sit on, but that they also have
46. See infra notes 86, 167, and accompanying text (noting instances where judges who
are not part of the panel enjoy at least technical assignment power).
47. See HOWARD, supra note 14, at 247.
48. Indeed, some judges may find themselves as senior judge on some panels and junior
judge on other panels.
49. Also, as Judge Posner notes, the costs of dissent rise as the size of the panel shrinks.
See POSNER, supra note 1, at 123–24.
50. See Atkins, supra note 10, at 413 (“Since only minimal overt conflict exists on courts
of appeals, there is little apparent need to gear opinion assignments toward those political ends.”
(footnote omitted)).
51. See Ahmed E. Taha, How Panels Affect Judges: Evidence from United States District
Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2005) (noting the link between judicial collegiality and
unanimous opinions). For a discussion of the benefits of collegiality in the judicial decisionmaking process, see Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1644–45 (2003) (emphasizing the value of collegiality on
multimember courts); COHEN, supra note 9, at 12–13, 162–65 (discussing the role, and presence,
of collegiality on courts of appeals).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/3

16

Nash: Expertise and Opinion Assignment on the Courts of Appeals: A Prel

2014]

EXPERTISE AND OPINION ASSIGNMENT ON THE COURTS OF APPEALS

1615

an institutional role—to ensure that opinion assignments are doled out
equivalently across members of the court.52 An agenda-setting court is
more likely to have a chief judge who is politically appointed.53 For
example, the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,
appoints the Chief Justice of the United States, who may in fact be
junior in service to every other Supreme Court Justice. Once appointed,
the Chief Justice can be removed only for good cause; his term
otherwise expires only upon his retirement or death.
In contrast, a judge becomes chief judge of a federal appellate court
purely by virtue of having the most years of service on that court and
being below a certain age; such positions, moreover, are time limited.
One would expect that the more influence ideology has in how a chief
judge comes to his or her position, the more he or she will take ideology
seriously in setting the court’s agenda, a consideration which will likely
extend to the tool of opinion assignment. In contrast, a chief judge who
ascends to his or her position by virtue of institutional rule will be more
likely to see his or her charge as less ideological.54 Such a judge is
accordingly more likely to see error correction as the court’s mission,
and thus, is more likely to rely on expertise in opinion assignment.55
Moreover, since a chief judge of a circuit will always have that position
by virtue of seniority on the court, one would expect that judge to have
had the chance to develop collegial relationships with many of his or
her fellow judges, which might also temper ideological-based opinion
assignments.56
In sum, when a non-ideological case is pending before an errorcorrecting court, an assignor will draw the greatest utility from an
assignee choice that both minimizes the time necessary to prepare the
opinion and also maximizes legal value benefits. As the next Part
explains, expertise-based opinion assignment fits this bill.
II. THE UTILITY OF EXPERTISE-BASED OPINION ASSIGNMENT
The previous Part explained that, at least in the setting of errorcorrecting courts hearing nonideological cases, assigning judges will
assign cases with an eye toward both minimizing the court resources
52. See, e.g., MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 37–38.
53. See Edwards, supra note 51, at 1677–78 (noting that the judicial appointment process
drives an emphasis on “ideological commitment” over collegiality concerns).
54. See id. at 1678 (noting anecdotally that judges appointed through the ideological
appointment process tended to feel “committed to the political party that ensured the
appointment” and then incorporate that ideology into their adjudicatory decisions).
55. See id. at 1678–89.
56. See generally id. at 1643–45 (discussing the development and effects of collegiality in
the context of the federal circuit courts).
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devoted to drafting the opinion and maximizing the legal benefits that
the court will ultimately draw from the finished opinion. Section II.A
elucidates three benefits that expertise-based opinion assignment
offers—efficiency benefits, legitimacy benefits, and reputation benefits.
Section II.B refines the analysis by exploring the supply of, and demand
for, expertise in opinion writing. Finally, Section II.C explains, in light
of the first two Sections, how courts of appeals deciding cases that raise
more technical than ideologically divisive issues are a prime location in
which to find expertise-based opinion assignment.
A. The Benefits of Expertise-Based Opinion Assignment
In this section, I survey three types of benefits to which expertisebased opinion assignment will typically give rise: efficiency benefits,
legitimacy benefits, and reputational benefits.
1. Efficiency Benefits
Efficiency benefits may arise with respect to both the court’s current
docket and its prospective docket. First, a judge with expertise in an
area can presumably write an opinion with less effort than a colleague
who lacks that expertise. Opinion specialization thus saves the court
(and the judges) effort in dispensing with its current docket.57
Second, the rule of precedent may empower courts to deploy expert
judges to reduce their docket going forward. A judge with expertise
may, more readily than a nonexpert judge, decisively dispose of an
issue.58 For example, the judge may feel more comfortable
announcing—and her copanelists may feel more comfortable allowing
her to announce—a more sweeping rule. Decisive opinions may allow
future panels of the court to more efficiently address other cases that
raise similar issues. Indeed, a decisive opinion may even discourage
future litigants from raising an issue, thus reducing the court’s future
docket.59 An expert judge might expend the same effort as a judge
57. See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 39 (1964) (noting that the
logic behind specialization is predicated on notions of economy); Atkins, supra note 10, at 413
(“[A] system of task specialization would be in conformity with the trend set by any
organization beset by increasing work loads.”); Cheng, supra note 10, at 549 (noting that
specialization promotes judicial efficiency and therefore may “alleviate some of the excess
caseload problems facing the federal courts”). But see Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise,
and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 849 (2012) (questioning the scope of the
efficiency benefits of judicial specialization).
58. Cheng, supra note 10, at 549 (noting that opinions written by experts are likely to be
more accurate, enjoy more legitimacy, and be more efficient).
59. I do not mean to say that such outcomes are always, or even ever normatively
desirable, only that an efficiency benefit might obtain. The efficiency benefit might actually
exact a cost on the court’s legitimacy. As Brenner and Spaeth have argued:
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without expertise, and yield an opinion that resolves more legal
questions, thus reducing the effort needed to resolve cases in the future.
2. Legitimacy Benefits
Legitimacy benefits offer a court the opportunity to establish, or
build upon, the perception—among other judges, the legal community,
the other branches of government, and the public-at-large—that it is
worthy of the powers vested in it and that it makes just, law-based
decisions.60 Having an expert judge draft opinions in his or her area of
expertise will tend to increase61 the court’s legitimacy and the
legitimacy of its decisions.62
[T]he Court’s specialist in a given issue area might too readily influence the
non-specialists. As a consequence, the decision handed down by the Court and
the majority opinion which justifies the doctrine might not reflect the
considered judgment of all members of the majority, but rather, the judgment of
the Court’s specialist.
Brenner & Spaeth, supra note 5, at 520. The legitimacy cost might outweigh the efficiency
benefit. Still, a court might opt for expertise-based opinion assignment based on its own
(possibly incorrect) balancing of the benefits and costs.
60. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
61. Opinion assignment based on expertise also might reduce a court’s legitimacy. A
court’s legitimacy is impaired when it is not seen as adhering to established judicial norms. See,
e.g., Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court More
Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195, 1198–99 (2008). While it was not always the case, see
generally J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges at the Court
of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1044–65 (2000), discussing “panel packing” by the Fifth
Circuit in the late 1950s and early 1960s in civil rights cases, it is today the norm (at least in
theory) to assemble random panels of judges and to assign cases to panels randomly, see infra
note 67. By analogy, one can argue that assignment of opinions to particular judges based upon
expertise is normatively undesirable. See, e.g., Chi. Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 706 (1994)
(“The main problem with having the presiding judge assign cases arises from the perception that
certain judges have areas of expertise. A judge with a strong interest in a subject matter will
assign to himself, or be assigned, a disproportionate number of cases in that area.”); 5TH CIR.
I.O.P. 34 (“Judges do not specialize. Assignments are made to equalize the workload of the
entire session.”); 11TH CIR. I.O.P. 34(15) (same).
Still, the norm against such assignments in the context of judicial expertise may be weaker
than the norm in favor of random assignment of cases to judges: The unenacted Blind Justice
Act of 1999, S. 1484, 106th Cong. § 2, which would have statutorily mandated random
assignment of circuit judges to panels (and district judges to cases), included a specific
exception allowing for assignment of judges to cases based on judicial expertise.
62. See Atkins, supra note 10, at 410 (noting that specializing case assignments develops
“expertise that may enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the decisions”). One way that
expertise may enhance legitimacy is by limiting the number of reversals that a court incurs. See
Charles M. Cameron et al., Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy: An Informational Model
of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 101, 102 (2000) (“Frequent
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3. Reputation Benefits
Commentators have not, to date, focused upon reputation benefits
that courts may garner from having experts write opinions in their areas
of expertise. Reputation benefits offer a court the chance to establish
itself as a leader in a particular area of law.63 Even to the extent that the
court is not directly competing with other courts for litigants,64 a court
that has an expert judge elucidating an area of law may find itself relied
upon by other courts that face similar issues. 65 In this way, the court’s
influence may grow.66
reversals bring the derision of colleagues and a decline in professional status.”). It has been said
that “[w]hen the Supreme Court has little interest in a technically demanding area (such as
admiralty or patent law), . . . the Court will largely or entirely abandon the area.” Id. at 108. The
intuition is that, in these types of areas, the Supreme Court—which is more politically oriented
than its subordinates—is more likely to believe that there is an objectively “correct” answer. See
Nash, supra note 29, at 112–13 n.130 (2003) (noting debate over whether the Condorcet Jury
Theorem is properly applicable in the context of appellate court panels based on whether or not
there exist “right” answers to legal questions).
Even granting that the Supreme Court focuses on ideologically charged areas and cases,
however, the Court still may not let lower court cases stand when it believes that the lower court
has not actually reached that correct answer. See Cameron & Kornhauser, supra note 43, at 178–
79; see also C. Scott Hemphill, Deciding Who Decides Intellectual Property Appeals, 19 FED.
CIR. B.J. 379, 381 (2010) (“In recent years, the Court has become an increasingly aggressive
reviewer of Federal Circuit patent lawmaking.”). But see Shapiro, supra note 42, at 278 (“Along
with the trend towards an almost exclusively discretionary docket came the Court’s attempt to
define its role not as the court of last resort for unhappy litigants, but as a forum to resolve
issues of broader concern.”).
In this sense, expert opinion authorship may convince the Court that the court below
reached the correct conclusion. This might be because the expert’s opinion is convincing, or
because the Court is more likely to defer to the reasoning of an expert. Thus, the likelihood of
reversal may be reduced, and as a corollary, the legitimacy of the lower court may be enhanced.
Note that this reasoning should not be read to discount the possibility that legitimacy benefits
might inhere even when an area of law is politicized. To the contrary, as this Article discusses
below, an expert might be able to draw legitimacy even while deciding a case ideologically by
infusing the opinion with expert language that cloaks the ideology. See infra note 71 and
accompanying text.
63. A judge’s expertise might enable him or her to develop a reputation in an area at a
comparative cost advantage to judges without that expertise. See, e.g., Klein & Morrisroe, supra
note 2, at 381–82 (“While we have no reason to doubt that Judge Wilkins is highly regarded by
his colleagues, it is clear that his leading score [for citation of his opinions] is attributable
largely to his service as chair of the United States Sentencing Commission.”).
64. See Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy Courts?,
94 GEO. L.J. 1141 (2006).
65. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 549 (noting that opinions written by judges with
expertise—especially in highly specialized areas of law—enjoy greater legitimacy and, in turn,
deference from others).
66. It is debatable whether circuits have reputations beyond the reputations of the
individual judges. Compare DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS 91–93 (2002) (finding little evidence of circuit reputations in interviews with circuit
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B. The Likelihood of Expertise-Based Opinion Assignment
Two broad considerations will affect the likelihood of expertisebased opinion assignment. The first is the supply of expertise for
opinion-writing purposes—i.e., the frequency with which cases arise in
which an expert might realistically be assigned to draft the opinions.
The second is the demand for expertise-based opinion assignment—i.e.,
the extent to which a court is motivated in fact to assign an expert to
draft an opinion when it is able.
1. Supply of Expertise
Several factors determine a court’s available supply of judges with
relevant expertise to draft opinions.
a. Frequency with Which the Area of Law Arises on the Court’s
Docket
The frequency with which cases in an area of law come before the
court affects the frequency with which an expert in the area might be
assigned to draft court opinions to the extent that not all judges on the
court hear all cases. If cases in an area of law appear sporadically on the
court’s docket, then it may be that the expert judge is rarely (or never)
on the panel when an issue in that area arises.67
b. The Position on the Court of the Judge with Expertise
Consider next the position on the court of the judge with expertise. If
the judge is the chief judge of the court, he may be limited in his
judges), with Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the United
States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1331, 1339–50 (2005) (canvassing literature to
identify various ways to measure a circuit’s reputation). I do not purport to resolve this debate
here. If a judge develops a reputation as an expert in an area of law, the circuit, along with the
judge, will reap the benefit of that expertise. The circuit will receive an additional benefit to the
extent that, as a consequence, its influence grows even through opinions authored by other
judges and in areas beyond the heart of the judge’s expertise.
67. Though it is not required by law, courts today generally assign judges to panels, and
panels to cases, randomly. COHEN, supra note 9, at 72; see MCKENNA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., supra note 1, at 101 (With minor exceptions, “assignment of cases to panels is random
and is separate from the assignment of judges to panels. The independent assignment of cases to
panels is to ensure that particular judges do not receive—or appear to receive—a
disproportionate share of particular case types”); Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1606 n.26 (2000); Brown & Lee, supra note 61, at 1041.
Matthew Hall has questioned empirically the random assignment of cases to panels. See
Matthew Hall, Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 574, 575 (2010). The Article tests, and
generally confirms, random assignment on the data this Article collected. See infra Subsection
IV.A.3.
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freedom to take full advantage of that expertise. The chief judge may be
reluctant to assign himself a disproportionate share of a particular type
of case for fear of the institutional message it might send.68 The chief
judge also may feel constrained by the requirement of equal
distributions not to self-assign excessively.69
The expertise of a senior circuit judge may also not be fully
exploited. Many circuit judges who have taken senior status hear far
fewer cases than their active colleagues. Their relative unavailability
may force other judges to confront major issues in the senior circuit
judge’s field of expertise.70
2. Demand for Expertise-Based Opinion Assignment
Similar to the supply of expertise, several factors affect the extent to
which a court will benefit from, and therefore ‘demand’, expertisebased opinion assignment.
a. Area of Law in Which the Expertise Lies
First, the more difficult the expertise is to replicate, the more
valuable it will be. Thus, all else equal, expertise in a more technically
complicated area will be more valuable.71 Along similar lines, expertise
68. MALTZMAN ET. AL., supra note 1, at 37.
69. See id. at 37–38. For additional factors assigning judges may consider when opting
not to self-assign, see Lax & Cameron, supra note 17, at 293 (offering more instrumental
reasons for a Chief Justice not to self-assign).
70. The same is likely to be true of district judges, and other judges from other courts who
sit “by designation” on court of appeals panels from time to time. In addition, it is less likely
that expert opinions by a judge from one court sitting by designation on another court would
inure to the general benefit of the second court.
71. See, e.g., DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 135 (1988) (noting that
Judge David Dyer possessed “expertise in two high specialized areas of law, admiralty and
aviation,” and as a result of this expertise, Judge Dyer “continued to respond to the court’s
request to fashion opinions on tedious, complex admiralty cases” long after he graduated to
senior judge); Robert M. Howard, Comparing the Decision Making of Specialized Courts and
General Courts: An Exploration of Tax Decisions, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 135, 136 (2005) (“Tax cases
often involve technically complex issues calling for significant judicial discretion in
interpretation. The evaluation of such claims usually demands expertise in the policy area.”);
Brenner & Spaeth, supra note 5, at 520 (“Some areas of the law are particularly complex (e.g.,
tax law) and it is more efficient to assign those areas to specialists.”).
It may be that the technical nature of an area of law in fact invites those who are versed in
the area to couch ideology in seemingly legalistic reasoning:
[B]ecause tax policy is complex, judges of general jurisdiction courts need to
rely more on litigants, lawyers, the IRS, and other courts for the meaning and
proper construction of the Internal Revenue Code; this reliance on outside
interpretation will restrict the use of ideology in the rulings by the district court
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in a relatively new area of law—such as a statutory or regulatory
scheme—will also be valuable, at least in the short-term.72 On the other
hand, when any judge can easily obtain expertise in an area of law,
expertise in that area is of less value. In particular, expertise that can
readily be gained simply by hearing cases in an area is of less value than
deeper expertise that cannot be thus obtained.73
Second, the more uncommon expertise in that area of law is, the
more valuable is a particular judge’s expertise. Thus, an individual
judge’s expertise in an area is more important the less it is shared by
other judges on the court.74 Put another way, the more judges who share
an expertise, the less important a role expertise will play in assigning
opinions among judges.

judges. Tax court judges’ expertise, and the concomitant lack of reliance on
others, means that the tax court judges have greater freedom to use their
ideology in their rulings.
Howard, supra, at 141; cf. Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to
Certify Questions of State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1745 (2003) (noting that state high
courts may have a particularly good opportunity to decide cases with bias against out-of-state
residents by embedding that bias in obscure statements of state law). To whatever extent that
may be the case, that is not inconsistent with my point: A court may assign cases in a field to
Judge X, an expert in that field, on the assumption that Judge X decides those cases based on her
expertise, when in fact Judge X’s opinions and decisions are ideologically driven. Still, the fact
remains that the court’s decision to assign the cases to Judge X is based upon considerations of
expertise, and Judge X’s expertise enables her to hide her ideology such that the court views
those opinions and decisions to be expertly (and not ideologically) decided even after the fact.
72. See KLEIN, supra note 66, at 75–78 (finding that judicial rules announced by
experts—although with the term defined by reference to prior opinion writing in the area—fared
better in subsequent cases than did opinions announced by nonexperts).
73. It seems dubious that, simply from hearing cases in an area, one can gain expertise as
deep as one would get from practicing in the area as a lawyer or participating in drafting the law
as a legislator or regulator. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 205 (2008) (“No judge
of [a non-specialty] court can be an expert in more than a small fraction of the fields of law that
generate the appeals that he must decide, or can devote enough time to an individual case to
make himself, if only for the moment (knowledge obtained by cramming is quickly forgotten),
an expert in the field out of which the case arises.”). But see COHEN, supra note 9, at 49
(suggesting that a judge can gain expertise during their tenure by learning the law for each case
over which they preside). To the extent that one can gain some expertise that way, that expertise
reduces, at least somewhat, the value of the expert judge.
74. Note the implication for whether the court is a generalist or specialist court. To be
sure, one of the benefits of having a court specialize in a particular area of law is to have judges
who are experts in, or become experts in, that area of law. Howard, supra note 71, at 136
(“Expertise is a significant benefit of a specialized court.”). Still, the value of each judge’s
expertise is reduced by virtue of the substitutability of judges.
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b. Frequency with Which the Area of Law Arises on the Court’s
Docket
The frequency with which the area of law (in which a judge has
expertise) arises on the court’s dockets implicates both the frequency
with which the court has the opportunity to assign opinions in the area
to an expert (as discussed above), and also the demand for that expert to
draft opinions in the area. There is reason to suspect that expertisebased assignment does not always increase as an area in which a judge
has expertise arises more frequently on the court’s docket. Given the
random assignment of cases to judges on appeals courts, an expert
might never have the opportunity to hear a case in the area of his or her
expertise if the area of law arises with extreme infrequency. Thus, if an
area of law makes infrequent appearances in court cases, expertise in
that area will not provide much in the way of efficiency benefits, let
alone legitimacy or reputation benefits.
On the other hand, if an area of law arises with great frequency, then
(i) it is more likely that other judges will have the opportunity to
develop their own expertise in the area, and, more importantly (ii) it is
more likely that nonexpert judges may often have to resolve issues
before the expert judge has an opportunity to resolve them. More
generally, the more heterogeneous a court’s docket, the greater the
demand for an individual judge’s expertise. Opinion specialization
matters more where one judge’s expertise in an area frees other judges
from having to decide, at least in the first instance, challenging issues in
that area.75 If the court specializes in cases in that area, the efficiency
benefits from opinion specialization tend to dissipate. It is also more
likely that more judges on a court that specialize in a particular area will
possess similar expertise.76
A second point is whether the area in which a judge’s expertise lies
arises mostly in conjunction with other issues from other areas of law,
or whether it more often appears as the central focus of the cases. An
expertise in an area that arises frequently but in conjunction with issues
75. See URPHY, supra note 57, at 39.
76. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Professor Daniel Meador argues against
classifying courts as “generalist” or “specialist” based upon the court’s defined subject matter
jurisdiction. Instead, he suggests that one must examine the scope of cases that the court actually
is called upon to decide. See Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying
the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 611–15 (1989). The
validity of this point notwithstanding, it still seems that judges are usually appointed to courts
that are traditionally seen as specialist (not in the sense that Meador means) based upon their
special expertise. And, in contrast, judges are not usually appointed to courts that are seen as
generalist based upon special expertise. Indeed, it seems that prior expertise is hardly a
prerequisite for appointment to the regional courts of appeals.
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from other areas of law is less valuable than expertise that can be
deployed frequently to resolve entire cases. For example, a judge who
was involved in redrafting the Federal Rules of Evidence might find that
demand for that expertise is dispersed over cases that arise under a large
number of distinct areas of law, many of which may be quite unfamiliar
to the judge.
c. Status of the Court Within the Broader Judiciary
The extent to which the court is accepted within the broader
judiciary will affect the extent of the court’s demand for legitimacy
benefits. These benefits are less important the more a court is already
accepted and respected. As an example, non-Article III judges and
courts are typically thought to be in greater need of legitimization than
are their Article III counterparts.77 It is probably also the case that older,
more established courts need less legitimization than comparatively
newer courts.78
d. Frequency with Which the Area of Law Arises on Other Courts
The frequency with which the area of law comes before other courts
affects the demand for expertise by determining the opportunity for
establishing a reputation. A judge on the Fourth Circuit may have an
expertise in pneumoconiosis (“black lung” condition afflicting coal
miners), but it is likely that the extent of any inter-court benefit would
extend in large measure only to the Sixth Circuit, since the vast bulk of
those cases arise in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits.

77. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 118; Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REV. 47, 77 (1997) (“The federal judges opposed
the creation of more independent bankruptcy courts, because (1) they would lose their
appointment power over bankruptcy judges, and thus one of their main patronage opportunities,
and (2) their status would be diluted through the vast increase in the number of federal judicial
positions.”); Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal
District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO.
L.J. 607, 682–84 (2002) (arguing in favor of Article III judges self-consciously blurring the line
between Article III and non-Article III judges and tribunals in the face of the reality that nonArticle III adjudication is becoming more and more critical, but also noting the hurdles to the
distinction actually disappearing).
78. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 823 (2008) (noting that “[t]he firstgeneration jurists [on the Federal Circuit] were right to establish the bona fides of the court and
avoid attention” and arguing that “the court is now fully established,” so that “there is no longer
a need for the court to take defensive positions or to maintain a low profile;” indeed, “[n]ow that
the court is mature, it is time to press its position as a tribunal with special expertise and to
fulfill its role as the near-final authority in patent matters”).
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e. Whether the Court Has Coequal Sister Courts
A final factor that affects the demand for a judge’s expertise is
whether the court has coequal sister courts. The more courts of equal
level in the hierarchy, the more valuable we might expect a judge’s
expertise to be. The more courts there are at the same level, the more
reputation offers a court the means to differentiate itself from its sister
courts.
This may play out in two ways. First, some courts face actual
competition for litigants.79 It may be possible that a court with an expert
judge can attract litigants by having that judge announce rules and
decide cases in her area of expertise.
Second, even if courts do not actually compete for litigants—where,
for example, the choice of which court of appeals hears an appeal is
based not upon the choice of litigants but upon geography—the
existence of sister courts who are hearing similar issues may still create
an opportunity for a court to establish itself as an expert in a particular
area to which other courts will cite. Thus, for example, the Eighth
Circuit may look to the expert opinions of Judge Posner on the Seventh
Circuit in deciding antitrust cases.80 It is also possible that, to the extent
that the Eighth Circuit has yet to resolve an issue that Judge Posner on
the Seventh Circuit has addressed, a district court in the Eighth Circuit
may rely upon decisions of the Seventh Circuit in reaching its decision.
Note, moreover, that the district court’s reliance upon the Seventh
Circuit’s decisions may in turn influence the Eighth Circuit when it
eventually faces the issue. In this way, a court that has a judge who is an
expert in a field becomes an asset that bolsters that court’s reputation.
C. Likely Settings of Expertise-Based Opinion Assignment
The last section identified two general factors that may predict the
likelihood of expertise-based opinion assignment: the nature of the
court, and the type of subject matter. With respect to court type,
expertise-based opinion assignment should be more likely on a court
that (i) hears various types of cases, (ii) hears cases in relatively small
panels, (iii) is predominantly an error-correcting court, (iv) has a chief
judge who serves in that role not by virtue of ideology, (v) spreads
responsibility for opinion assignment to various judges, and (vi) has a
number of sister courts of equal and lesser rank in the judicial hierarchy.
A moment’s reflection confirms that the regional federal courts of

79. See Isaac DiIanni, The Role of Competition in the Market for Adjudication, 18 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 203, 211–12 (2012).
80. See KLEIN, supra note 66, at 93–96.
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appeals meet these criteria.81 Courts of appeals are predominantly errorcorrecting courts. The chief judge serves by virtue of a number of
objective factors, most importantly his or her seniority on the court.82
Appeals are almost always heard in panels of three judges. The circuit
courts hear all appeals brought to them, and drafting opinions is a timeconsuming matter for circuit judges.83 The circuit courts’ large
workload84 makes efficiency benefits very attractive.85
Though there is variation from circuit to circuit, courts of appeals, to
some degree, vest opinion assignment authority with the panel’s
presiding judge.86 The presiding judge on a panel will be either the
81. But see Unah & Wall, supra note 3, at 24 (finding evidence that expertise is a
statistically significant predictor of opinion assignment at the Supreme Court).
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006).
83. See, e.g., Letter from Alex Kozinski, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, to Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, at 9
(Jan. 16, 2004).
84. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 9, at 6–8 (noting the precipitous increase in the federal
courts of appeals).
85. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 524–25 (noting that efficiency is a goal most “difficult to
dismiss” given the burgeoning caseloads).
86. See id. at 527 n.35. Some courts empower the presiding judge to assign opinions even
in cases where he or she is not part of the majority coalition. See id. (noting that several circuits’
rules seem to allow this, and noting an email from Judge Richard Posner affirming that “the
Seventh Circuit allows the presiding judge to assign majority opinions even if he or she is in
dissent”). The Fourth Circuit vests opinion assignment authority in the chief judge, based upon
the recommendation of the presiding judge. See 4TH CIR. I.O.P. 36.1. But see infra note 167
(questioning the extent to which the presiding judge’s recommendation is overridden in
practice).
Some courts—perhaps most notably the Ninth Circuit—use a system of shared bench
memorandum that effectively alters the opinion assignment sequence. Traditionally, circuit
judges have had their law clerks prepare a bench memorandum for each case that they hear, and
therefore each member on a panel of three judges will have had his or her clerks prepare a
separate bench memorandum. Under a shared system, the presiding judges assigns one judge on
the panel the responsibility of preparing a bench memorandum for the entire panel for each case.
COHEN, supra note 9, at 94–95 (describing the practice); Harry Pregerson, The Seven Sins of
Appellate Brief Writing and Other Transgressions, 34 UCLA L. REV. 431, 433 (1986)
(“Generally, each judge’s staff prepares one or two bench memoranda for each day’s sitting.”);
Stephen L. Wasby, Clerking for an Appellate Judge: A Close Look, 5 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV.
19, 52–53 (2008) (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s practice); see also Patricia M. Wald, 19 Tips
from 19 Years on the Appellate Bench, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 7, 14 (1999) (noting that D.C.
Circuit panels do not typically share bench memoranda, but that in “monster cases . . . we
usually divide up the bench memoranda between chambers”). Typically, unless the judge who
had the responsibility to prepare the memorandum for the panel is not part of the majority
disposing of the case, that judge will then accede to opinion drafting responsibilities. See
COHEN, supra note 9, at 73 (“[W]hile the opinion-writing responsibility is separate from the
responsibility for drafting bench memoranda, judges rarely split those two responsibilities in
practice.”). In the end, however, this practice still leaves the assigning judge free to consider
factors like expertise, just like a judge making the initial assignment after oral argument. Cf. id.
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(i) Circuit Justice, (ii) if the Circuit Justice is not part of the panel, the
circuit’s chief judge, or (iii) if the chief judge also is not part of the
panel, the presiding judge87—the active circuit judge with the lengthiest
service on the court.88 Opinion assignment is thus not restricted to a
small number of judges on the court.89
Finally, there are many circuit courts, and many district courts within
each circuit. There is thus an opportunity for a small number of circuits
to differentiate themselves by featuring opinions in an area authored by
experts.
If the practices of the courts of appeals are logical places in which to
look for expertise-based opinion assignment, what areas of law might be
especially good places to look? Broadly speaking, expertise-based
opinion assignment will be more likely for subject matters that are (i)
novel or technical, and (ii) that arise with fair frequency both in the
court on which the expert sits and in other courts. One such area might
be securities regulation. This is a complex area of law where expertise
would substantially reduce opinion-preparation time and would also
enhance the issuing court’s legitimacy and reputation. Indeed, an
existing study confirms this notion. Professor Margaret Sachs finds that
Judge Henry Friendly was assigned a vastly disproportionate number of

(explaining that one judge reports sometimes being asked to identify those cases for which his
law clerks would be most interested in writing bench memoranda).
One source indicates that the Sixth Circuit uses a random opinion assignment system:
In the Sixth Circuit, majority opinions are assigned on a rotating schedule
rather than by the senior (or chief) judge on the panel. In the event that the
judge whose turn it is to author the “majority” opinion is not actually in the
majority, the opinion he writes becomes his individual dissent.
VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 133 n.3 (2006). Another source
indicates that some presiding judges assign responsibility for drafting bench memoranda for the
panel in advance of oral argument—and therefore effectively in most cases end up assigning
responsibility for opinion drafting as well—randomly. See COHEN, supra note 9, at 73.
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 45(b).
88. See id. (“[Besides the chief judge, o]ther circuit judges of the court in regular active
service shall have precedence and preside according to the seniority of their commissions.”).
Congress enacted this provision to eliminate attempts by senior circuit judges to retain opinion
assignment authority after assuming senior status. See HOWARD, supra note 14, at 247 n.w.
89. See supra note 86 and accompanying text; see also HOWARD, supra note 14, at 247
(“[P]anel rotation and seniority diffuse the power to assign.”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu
Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning: Covering in Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 735,
749 (2008) (“[U]nlike the Supreme Court, which has control over its docket, the assignment
power itself is not as important to the circuit courts because the courts sit in panels, and there is
generally a large docket that needs to be shared. Thus, judges are forced to cooperate, and the
importance of hierarchy is diminished.”).
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securities regulation opinions during his tenure on the Second Circuit.90
Professor Sachs attributes this result at least in part to the fact that Judge
Friendly was one of only two circuit judges who served on a
(nonjudicial) panel that sought, ultimately without success, to redraft the
federal securities laws.91 Professor Sachs notes that “his connection
with the [project] likely enhanced his standing as a securities expert
among his Second Circuit colleagues,” which “in turn probably
increased the number of important securities opinions that he was
assigned to write.”92 Finally, Sachs argues that Judge Friendly’s
reputation among the federal judiciary was enhanced by virtue of the
fact that the Second Circuit, which had been the nation’s premiere
federal commercial court, was beginning a period where it would
dominate federal appellate court output of securities law opinions.93
The theory suggests several testable hypotheses. First, one would
expect to observe heightened assignment of cases to judges with an
expertise in a relatively nonideological area.
Hypothesis 1: A circuit judge with expertise in a relatively
nonideological area will be assigned opinion assignment
responsibility in a disproportionate share of cases in that
area.
Second, one would expect a judge’s expertise to influence opinion
assignment only at a time when the court actually hears cases that raise
issues in the area of expertise. If the expertise does not enhance the
legal reasoning necessary to the resolution of cases, then one would not
expect it to result in the disproportionate assignment of opinions.
Hypothesis 2: A circuit judge with expertise in a relatively
nonideological area will be assigned opinion responsibility
in a disproportionate share of cases in that area only when
the expertise is relevant to the decision of cases.
Third, one would expect expertise to be more valuable, and therefore
expect to see more expertise-based opinion assignment, in cases that
raise more, rather than fewer, issues of law in the area in question.

90. See Margaret V. Sachs, Judge Friendly and the Law of Securities Regulation: The
Creation of a Judicial Reputation, 50 SMU L. REV. 777, 809–10 (1997).
91. See id. at 794.
92. Id. at 795; see also id. at 813 (“Presiding judges probably assigned Judge Friendly a
disproportionate share of securities opinions for three reasons: he was (1) interested in securities
regulation; (2) an expert in the subject area; and (3) senior to many of his colleagues at a
relatively early stage of his judicial career.”).
93. See id. at 791–93.
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Hypothesis 3: A circuit judge with expertise in a relatively
nonideological area will be assigned responsibility to write
an even more disproportionate share of opinions in cases
that raise more issues of law in the area in question.
Fourth, to the extent that opinion assignment in nonideological cases
is based more on expertise than on politics, one would expect the
political leanings of judges to play a comparatively minor role in the
assignment of opinions.
Hypothesis 4: A circuit judge with expertise in a relatively
nonideological area will be assigned a disproportionate
share of opinions in those cases, regardless of the party of
the president who appointed the assigning judge.
Fifth, along similar lines, one would expect expertise to overcome
years of judicial service in the assignment of opinions in relatively
nonideological cases.
Hypothesis 5: A circuit judge with expertise in a relatively
nonideological area will be assigned a disproportionate
share of opinions in those cases, even if he or she is not the
assigning judge, and regardless of whether he or she is the
middle or junior member of the majority coalition.
III. TWO SETTINGS FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND BANKRUPTCY
This Part describes the two settings tested in Part IV for observable
implications of the theory of expertise-based opinion assignment
advanced in Parts I and II. The first setting is the assignment of opinions
in appeals from convictions for federal crimes—particularly those
implicating the United States Sentencing Guidelines—to circuit judges
who served as Commissioners on the Sentencing Commission when the
Guidelines were drafted.94 The second setting is the assignment of
bankruptcy opinions to circuit judges who previously served as federal
bankruptcy judges.
A. The Sentencing Guidelines and the Commissioners
This Section first describes the Sentencing Guidelines and explains
why they present an area of law well suited to expertise-based opinion
assignment. This Section then offers brief biographies of two men—
William W. Wilkins, Jr., and Stephen G. Breyer—who each served both
94. Cf. Unah & Wall, supra note 3, at 16–20 (measuring expertise of Supreme Court
Justices based upon credentials, experience, and track record).
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as Commissioners during the Guidelines drafting process and also as
circuit judges during the early years of the Guidelines’ applicability.
1. The Guidelines
The assignment of opinions under the federal Sentencing Guidelines
to experts who helped draft the Guidelines is an especially felicitous
area in which to conduct such an investigation. First, the advent of the
Guidelines constituted an exogenous shock. Before their effective date,
the sentencing system in federal court (and, for that matter, in state
courts) looked entirely different. Second, once the Guidelines took
effect, Guidelines cases flooded the federal courts. Third, only two
active circuit judges served on the commission that drafted those
Guidelines; their expertise was thus very unique.
Prior to the advent of the Guidelines, the sentencing system in
federal court looked entirely different. Absent statutory mandates,
district judges were largely free to impose sentences as they saw fit
following conviction.95 Frustrated with what it saw as needless
discontinuity in sentencing, Congress decided to make a fundamental
change to the system. The Sentencing Reform Act of 198496 (the “Act”)
established the United States Sentencing Commission (the
“Commission”). The Commission consists of seven voting members,
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.97
The Commission was charged with drafting, and later amending,
sentencing guidelines in accordance with the broad mandate of
Congress, as expressed in the Act, for use by federal district judges in
criminal matters.98 The Sentencing Guidelines initially went into effect
on November 1, 1987.99
An initial question that dogged the Guidelines was whether
Congress’s delegation to the Commission ran afoul of constitutional
separation of powers principles. The Supreme Court answered that
question in the negative in its 1989 decision in Mistretta v. United
95. See Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of
Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 79 n.156 (1995) (noting Congress passed the
Sentencing Reform Act in part to respond to the “tremendous discretion accorded to district
judges in the criminal sentencing process”).
96. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
97. See An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
3, http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf
(last visited Aug. 25, 2014).
98. See id. at 1; Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24,
26 (2006).
99. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 97, at 2.
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States.100 Many years later, in 2005, the Court in United States v.
Booker101 held that the Guidelines had to be interpreted as merely
advisory, and not binding on district courts, in order to be
constitutional.102 After Booker, courts of appeals review sentences
meted out by district courts only for their reasonableness in light of the
Guidelines.103 During the intervening period, however, the Guidelines
were mandatorily applied in all federal district courts, with appeals
lying to the courts of appeals.104
The Guidelines instituted a bureaucratic scheme that vests far less
discretion in trial judges.105 Broadly speaking, the Guidelines call for
the sentencing judge to identify two numerical dimensions for each
criminal defendant to be sentenced: the offense level and the criminal
history category.106 The crime for which the defendant has been
convicted sets the “base offense level.”107 Levels are then added or
subtracted based upon various factors, such as whether a gun was used
to effectuate the crime (addition) and whether the defendant accepts
responsibility for his or her actions (subtraction).108 The criminal history
category is determined by reference to the prior criminal offenses
committed by the defendant.109 The Guidelines provide a grid that,
given various combinations and ranges of offense level and criminal
history category, produces a sentencing range.110 Under congressional
statute, a sentencing judge can depart from the sentencing range
produced by rigid application of the Guidelines if there is an
“aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
100. 488 U.S. 361, 380–84 (1989).
101. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
102. Id. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., delivering opinion of the Court in part); see also id. at 245
(Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part) (finding unconstitutional “the provision
of the federal sentencing statute that made the Guidelines mandatory”). In two decisions earlier
in the decade—Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296 (2004)—the Court had held state sentencing schemes unconstitutional to the extent
that they allowed a trial judge, and not juries, to find facts used to enhance sentences beyond the
maximum provided by statute. The Booker Court saw the earlier cases as mandating the
conclusion that binding federal Sentencing Guidelines were similarly unconstitutional. Booker,
543 U.S. at 226–27 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part).
103. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 259–62 (discussing the reasonableness standard).
104. Id. at 233, 260.
105. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 26.
106. See id. at 26 (noting the variables included in the judge’s post-conviction sentencing
calculus).
107. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2 introductory cmt. (2013).
108. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 27 (noting that base levels can be
adjusted by adding or subtracting “offense-level points”).
109. Id. at 26 n.5.
110. Id. at 26.
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adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the [G]uidelines.”111
The federal courts of appeals’ application of the Sentencing
Guidelines provides an excellent setting in which to examine expertisebased opinion assignment. As an initial matter, as discussed above in
Section II.C, one would expect expertise-based opinion assignment to
be at least somewhat common on the regional courts of appeals.
The Guidelines themselves, at least early on, were an area ripe for
expertise-based opinion assignment. First, given the novelty of the
Guidelines scheme, no judge—trial or appellate—had judicial
experience with the Guidelines prior to their effective date.112 The few
judges who had experience with them were those members of the
Sentencing Commission who drafted the initial Guidelines. Those
judges, then, had significant expertise that none of their fellow judges
had.
Second, the Guidelines are fairly technical.113 As noted above, the
Guidelines scheme introduced elements more familiar to administrative
law than criminal law. The Guidelines issues that came before the
courts, at least early on, were less likely to be ideologically charged.114
111. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2012). In 1994, the Commission elucidated that factors “not
ordinarily” relevant to sentencing could justify a departure from the ordinary Guideline
sentencing range if those factors removed the case from the Guidelines’ “heartland.” U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 & cmt. (2013) (policy statement).
112. Only a few states had sentencing guidelines regimes before the advent of the federal
system. And the few that did, differed from the federal approach, particularly in that they did not
constrain trial judges’ discretion at sentencing. Moreover, even those states that implemented
guidelines programs in the wake of the federal program eschewed the federal model in favor of
the preexisting state programs. See generally Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Apples and Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679, 679–80
(1992) (explaining that states generally rejected guidelines resembling federal efforts).
113. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing
Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 718
(2008) (noting that the Guidelines’ regulations “rival the tax code in length”); Stephen Breyer,
Justice Breyer: Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1999, at 32
(recognizing the “important criticism . . . that the guidelines are simply too long and too
complicated”).
114. See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 241–53 (finding limited evidence of
ideology influencing sentencing decisions, even post-Booker); Breyer, supra note 113, at 28
(noting that Congress acted “in bipartisan fashion” in creating the Commission and calling for
the introduction of sentencing guidelines); Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 113, at 715 n.4
(“Senator Edward Kennedy was a sponsor of the Sentencing Reform Act, and President Reagan
enthusiastically signed the legislation.”); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing
Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 223, 266 (1993).
This is not to say that Guidelines issues are devoid of ideological content. To the contrary,
criminal law is an area where commentators have found strong evidence of ideological voting
on the courts of appeals. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? 17–19
(2006). More specifically, Professors Gregory Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew Morriss found
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Third, Guidelines issues certainly arise with enough frequency to
make them valuable. Criminal cases occupy a large portion of the courts
of appeals’ dockets.115 Moreover, the advent of the Guidelines invited
more attorneys to raise sentencing issues. The Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants the services of legal counsel, and governmentprovided attorneys represent a substantial number of criminal
defendants.116 In addition, appeal to the court of appeals is as of right.117
that the votes cast by district judges on the question of whether the Guidelines were
constitutional prior to the Supreme Court’s clarifying decision in Mistretta, were influenced by
the party of the President who appointed the judges. See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise &
Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1403 (1998). Further, Professors Max
Schanzenbach and Emerson Tiller have amassed empirical evidence that district courts tend to
choose a method for departing from a Guideline range (whether upward or downward) that is
more insulated from appellate review—i.e., that is subject to more deferential review by the
court of appeals—when the court of appeals to which the appeal would lie is more ideologically
distant from the sentencing district judge. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 32–33;
Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 113, at 725. (It is important to note, however, that
Schanzenbach and Tiller present no empirical evidence that in fact the courts of appeals engage
in ideological voting in Guidelines cases; their data consist of sentences imposed by district
judges, not the disposition of those sentences on appeal.)
In the study here, I choose to consider cases decided during the time period from 1990–93
in part because support for the Guidelines was more ideologically uniform (as the quotation in
the text indicates), and because presumably early cases were more likely to raise questions about
how the Guidelines were technically supposed to function, as opposed to issues about the choice
of sentence within the rules of the Guidelines (which might invite more ideological debate). Cf.
Sisk et al., supra, at 1407–09 (collecting data during 1988, before the Supreme Court’s Mistretta
decision was handed down in early 1989); Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 35 (“We
begin with 1992 because the Guidelines were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1989 and the
permissibility of certain grounds for downward departures became clearer in the early 1990s.”).
To be sure, there was hardly unanimous support for the Guidelines. Indeed, a large number
of federal judges—including many district judges and appellate judges who had served as
district judges—opposed the Guidelines on the ground that it reduced the discretionary authority
of district judges. See, e.g., Richard T. Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the
Retirement Decisions of Federal Judges?, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 231, 235 (2004); Knapp &
Hauptly, supra note 112, at 679 & n.1 (1992); Stith & Koh, supra, at 281. There is no evidence,
however, nor does the literature suggest, that this opposition in any way correlated with
ideology.
115. For example, for the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2013, there were 12,674
federal criminal appeals on the dockets of the various regional federal courts of appeal; this
constituted 29.68% of the courts’ total docket of 42,709 appeals. U.S. Courts of Appeals—
Nature of Suit or Offense in Cases Arising from the U.S. District Courts, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistic
s/2013/tables/B07Mar13.pdf (last visited Aug. 26, 2014).
Note, moreover, that sentencing is a part even of criminal cases where the defendant pleads
guilty, whether because of a plea bargain or otherwise. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note
98, at 28.
116. Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: SelfSelection by the “Marginally Indigent,” 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223, 223, 238 (2005).
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As a result, many attorneys appealing clients’ criminal convictions look
for issues to raise that will not be completely meritless. The advent of
the Guidelines provided attorneys with a number of arguments that were
novel and at least colorable. Moreover, Guidelines issues very often
were (and still are) substantial portions of criminal cases; often
Guidelines issues dominated the questions raised in appeals.118
Fourth, Guidelines issues arise across the regional circuit courts of
appeals. Thus, the opportunity for a court with an expert judge in this
area to reap reputation benefits was ripe.
Fifth, even to the extent that the frequency with which Guidelines
issues arise would allow other judges to develop some expertise in the
area, the novelty of the Guidelines gave judges with Commission
experience at least some expertise advantage vis-à-vis other judges for
some period of time.
Finally, it is possible to identify a period of time during which
Guidelines cases were likely to be largely nonideological. The empirical
study of Guidelines cases focuses on this period. Some commentators
suggest that decision-making under the Guidelines had ideological
elements during two time periods. From their initial promulgation in
1987 until the Supreme Court ruled the Guidelines constitutional in
1989,119 the predominant issue facing courts of appeals was whether the
Guidelines were constitutional, an issue that invited ideological
debate.120 Then, after the basic workings of the Guidelines had been
fleshed out,121 the courts of appeals faced issues such as whether the
trial courts had exercised their discretion properly in choosing a
sentence length within the proper range.122 This, too, was an issue that

117. See Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
127, 161–62 (1995) (noting that while “the right to appeal has not explicitly been recognized as
a federal constitutional right,” the right to appeal is a “sacrosanct” notion that is a “de facto part”
of the American judicial system).
118. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World
of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1100 (2001) (advancing sentencing as one of the most
important components of criminal litigation).
119. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
120. See Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 114, at 1381–82.
121. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 35 (noting that “the permissibility of
certain grounds for downward departures became clearer in the early 1990s”).
122. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 113, at 719–20 (noting that the Supreme Court
in a 1996 case required appellate courts to review a district court’s deviation from the
Guidelines under the abuse of discretion standard, increasing the trial court’s risk of reversal).
This period ended in 2005 with the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), ultimately holding mandatory application of the Guidelines to be unconstitutional. See
supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text.
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might divide judges along ideological lines.123 In between these periods,
however—starting in 1989 and into the mid-1990s—was a period
during which the courts of appeals, now assured of the Guidelines’
constitutionality, struggled instead with exactly how the Guidelines
worked. The questions raised during this period were largely legal and
technocratic; they were less likely to raise ideologically charged
issues.124
2. Backgrounds of Judge Wilkins and Judge Breyer
When the Sentencing Commission drafted the original Guidelines,
William Wilkins—a Fourth Circuit Judge at the time—served as Chair,
and Stephen Breyer—then a First Circuit judge—served as a
Commissioner.125
After graduating from the University of South Carolina School of
Law in 1967, Judge Wilkins clerked for a Fourth Circuit judge, worked
as a legal assistant for Senator Strom Thurmond, and worked in private
practice.126 From 1974–1981, he served as a state solicitor in South
Carolina.127
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan appointed Wilkins as a United

123. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 35 (presenting empirical evidence,
beginning with decisions rendered in 1992, that district courts tend to choose a method for
departing from a Guideline range (whether upward or downward) that is more insulated from
appellate review—i.e., that is subject to more deferential review by the court of appeals—when
the court of appeals to which the appeal would lie is more ideologically opposed to the
sentencing district judge).
124. See id. (noting, with respect to a study presenting empirical evidence of ideological
decision-making by district courts in sentencing cases, that “[w]e begin with 1992 because the
Guidelines were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1989 and the permissibility of certain grounds
for downward departures became clearer in the early 1990s”).
125. Stith & Koh, supra note 114, at 236 n.81 (noting Judge Wilkins’s chairmanship);
Breyer, supra note 113, at 28 (noting that Justice Breyer served as an original member of the
sentencing commission from 1985 to 1989 under Chairman Wilkins). George E. MacKinnon,
then a Senior Circuit Judge on the District of Columbia Circuit, served as a Commissioner
during that time. See David Binder, George E. MacKinnon, 89, Dies; Was Appeals Judge for 25
Years, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/03/obituaries/george-emackinnon-89-dies-was-appeals-judge-for-25-years.html; Former Commissioner Information,
supra note 25. Judge MacKinnon sat on only fourteen panels during the time period that this
Article studied; none was an appeal of a federal conviction. Most of the cases were special cases
dedicated to challenges to the independent counsel law then in effect. Since Judge MacKinnon
did not have the opportunity to author opinions in Guidelines cases, this Article leaves him out
of the study.
126. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Wilkins, William Walker, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2586&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Aug. 26, 2014).
127. Id.
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States District Judge for the District of South Carolina.128 In 1986,
President Reagan elevated Judge Wilkins to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.129 Prior to that, in 1985, the President
appointed Wilkins to another position: Chair of the newly formed
United States Sentencing Commission.130 He served in that capacity
until 1994.131
After his tenure on the Sentencing Commission, Wilkins remained a
circuit judge. He served as the Fourth Circuit’s Chief Judge from 2003
to 2007.132 He assumed senior status in 2007 and, in 2008, retired from
the bench and joined a private practice.133
After graduating from Harvard Law School in 1964, Justice Breyer
served as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg.134 After
a two-year period working in the Justice Department in the area of
antitrust, he was a faculty member at Harvard Law School from 1967–
1994 (with a joint appointment at the Kennedy School of Government
from 1977–1980), where a major area of expertise was administrative
law.135 Breyer served as an assistant special prosecutor in the Watergate
prosecutions, special counsel to the Administrative Practices
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1974–1975, and
chief counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1979–1980.136
In 1980, President Jimmy Carter appointed Breyer as a United States
Circuit Judge for the First Circuit.137 In 1985, President Reagan
appointed Breyer as a Commissioner on the Sentencing Commission; he
served in that capacity until 1989.138 In 1990, Breyer became Chief
Judge of the First Circuit. He remained Chief Judge until President Bill
Clinton appointed him to the Supreme Court in 1994.139
While Judge Wilkins had considerable experience in criminal
litigation before ascending to the bench, he had no prior experience with
respect to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; indeed, he could have had
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Breyer, Stephen Gerald, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=255&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Aug.
25, 2014) [hereinafter Judge Breyer Biography].
135. Id. Justice Breyer is, even today a coauthor on one of the leading administrative law
casebooks: STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES (7th ed. 2011).
136. Judge Breyer Biography, supra note 134.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id..
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none. As a Commissioner responsible for drafting those Guidelines, he
became one of the few people, let alone judges, most familiar with them
when they took effect. While Judge Breyer lacked substantial prior
criminal law experience, his experience with the Guidelines was
similarly unique.140
B. Bankruptcy Cases and Former Federal Bankruptcy Judges
Bankruptcy law is an especially apt area of law in which to initially
test the theory of expertise outlined in the previous Section. Consider
how well court of appeals bankruptcy cases map onto the paradigmatic
types of cases where, according to Section II.C, one should expect to
find expertise-based opinion assignment. As an initial matter, courts of
appeals are likely settings for expertise-based opinion assignment. In
general, circuit judges have no particular expertise in bankruptcy.
140. Of course, Judge Wilkins’s and Judge Breyer’s expertise would only be valuable if
that very expertise did not compel them to recuse themselves in Sentencing Guideline cases. In
effect, this amounts to an all-or-nothing proposition: Blanket recusal would mean hearing no
Guidelines cases; rejection of blanket recusal leaves the court free to deploy the judge to handle
many such cases.
Over the years, courts have rejected the argument that blanket recusal is mandated for
judges who have served or are serving as Commissioners. See United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d
437, 445–47 (1st Cir. 1989) (Breyer, J., writing separately) (rejecting blanket recusal, but
accepting that recusal might be appropriate in individual cases, depending upon the issues
raised); United States v. Glick, 946 F.2d 335, 336–37 (4th Cir. 1991) (writing for the majority,
Judge Wilkins noted that the three-judge panel unanimously rejected a recusal argument).
Interestingly, in its unreported decision in United States v. McLellan, the Eleventh Circuit
held that a district judge—selected for the Commission while a U.S. Attorney, but subsequently
appointed to the bench—should have recused herself in a case where the defendant challenged
the function of the Sentencing Commission. See In re United States, 60 F.3d 729, 730 (11th Cir.
1995) (discussing the unpublished opinion of the court in United States v. McLellan, No. 938177 (11th Cir. June 30, 1994)). The case was thereafter remanded, with further proceedings
before a different district judge. Id. When the case reached the Eleventh Circuit again, the
second panel expressly limited the recusal holding to the case at hand:
We emphatically disavow . . . any intention to adopt in this published
opinion the prior McLellan opinion’s holding on the recusal issue. While that
holding may be law of the case insofar as this panel is concerned, because the
prior McLellan opinion was unpublished, its holding on the recusal issue is not
law of this circuit and will not be binding on any future panel in a case
involving a different defendant.
Id. at 731 n.2.
Judge Wilkins did recuse himself in the Guidelines case of United States v. Carroll, 3 F.3d
98, 99 n.* (4th Cir. 1993). In Carroll, the government argued that the Commission had exceeded
its authority in promulgating certain Guidelines. Id. at 101–02. For discussion and critique of the
Guidelines recusal issue, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats:
Mistretta and Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 437–40 (1997).
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Moreover, bankruptcy is an area of law where expertise is likely,
according to the theory, to be an important consideration in opinion
assignment. First, bankruptcy cases in general seem to fall within the
rubric of “nonideological cases.” Commentators have long questioned
whether the ideological pressures found to influence judicial voting in
other areas extend to bankruptcy.141 In a recent empirical study, Rafael
Pardo and I searched in vain for evidence of ideological voting by court
of appeals judges in bankruptcy cases.142
Second, bankruptcy is both substantively and procedurally distinct as
an area of law. On substance, bankruptcy proceedings are guided by a
“Bankruptcy Code” (the “Code”), which occupies its own title of the
United States Code. The Code is complex, and many of its provisions
are technical.143 Further, the Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure provide for various procedures unique to bankruptcy.
Moreover, federal bankruptcy litigation occurs within a unique
judicial hierarchy, depicted in Figure 1.144 Congress has seen fit to
create bankruptcy courts as “unit[s]” of the various federal district
courts.145 While Congress has technically left it to the discretion of the
141. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 114, at 16 (“Might ideological voting and panel
effects be found in apparently nonideological cases involving, for example, bankruptcy, torts,
and civil procedure?”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 831, 842 (2008) (“Many areas of law remain entirely unstudied in the standard
terms, including, for example, antitrust, intellectual property, and bankruptcy. It would be useful
to know in which areas of law and under what circumstances the judicial personality has the
greatest (and the least) influence on decisions.”).
142. See Principal-Agent Theory, supra note 40, at 334–35 (noting that the empirical
analysis produced no evidence that ideology influenced voting behavior by bankruptcy judges).
143. See, e.g., Bradley M. Elbein, An Obscure Revolution: The Liability of Professionals in
Bankruptcy, 48 S.C. L. REV. 743, 745 n.9 (1997) (“[Unlike o]ther complex statutes,” the
“Bankruptcy Code consists of a thick volume of exceptions to a set of general rules never
explicitly and positively expressed by the statute itself but implicitly understood by
practitioners.”).
144. It should be noted that appellate review of a bankruptcy court’s decision can involve
direct appeal from the bankruptcy court to the court of appeals, with the effect of bypassing the
first tier of intermediate appellate review—the district court or the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
(BAP). An appeal may proceed directly to the court of appeals pursuant to a certification
procedure if one of the following circumstances exists: (i) the appeal involves a question of law
unresolved by the court of appeals for the circuit or by the Supreme Court; (ii) the appeal
involves a matter of public importance; (iii) the appeal involves a question of law requiring
resolution of conflicting decisions; or (iv) the appeal may materially advance the progress of the
case or proceeding in which the appeal is taken. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (2006). For a detailed
discussion of the use of this appellate path, see Laura B. Bartell, The Appeal of Direct Appeal—
Use of the New 28 U.S.C. §158(d)(2), 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 145 (2010) and Lindsey Freeman,
Comment, BAPCPA and Bankruptcy Direct Appeals: The Impact of Procedural Uncertainty on
Predictable Precedent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 543 (2011).
145. See 28 U.S.C. § 151.
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district courts to decide whether to refer bankruptcy cases in the first
instance to the bankruptcy courts,146 in practice every federal district has
a standing order that sends all bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy court
within the district for initial proceedings.147
Bankruptcy judges staff the bankruptcy courts. These non-Article III
judges are appointed for fourteen-year terms by the judges of the court
of appeals for the circuit in which the district in question lies.148
Bankruptcy judges may enter final judgments with respect to “core
proceedings,” which constitute the heart of bankruptcy issues.149 Appeal
from a final judgment in a core proceeding is ordinarily made to the
federal district court. However, the Judicial Code authorizes—indeed
urges—circuits to create bankruptcy appellate panels (BAPs)—tribunals
consisting of bankruptcy judges to hear appeals from the bankruptcy
courts in the circuit.150 In circuits that have them—currently the First,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits151—litigants appealing a
bankruptcy court judgment have the option of having their appeal heard
by either the district court or a three-judge BAP panel; both litigants
must consent to have an appeal heard by the BAP.152 Whether this
initial appeal is heard by the district court or the BAP, a second appeal
as of right lies to the court of appeals, with discretionary review by the
Supreme Court possible thereafter.153

146. See id. § 157(a).
147. Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate
Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1756 (2008).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1); see also id. § 152(a)(3) (“Whenever a majority of the judges of
any court of appeals cannot agree upon the appointment of a bankruptcy judge, the chief judge
of such court shall make such appointment.”).
149. See id. § 157(b)(1). Bankruptcy courts may also hear, but not enter final judgments in,
“a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise related to a case under title 11.”
Id. § 157(c)(1). Bankruptcy courts’ findings in non-core proceedings are reviewable de novo by
the district courts. Id.
150. See id. § 158(b)(1).
151. Nash & Pardo, supra note 147, at 1757.
152. See id. at 1757–58 (describing the appeals process for adjudications made by
bankruptcy courts). The judges of a federal district may vote to not participate in the BAP. 28
U.S.C. § 158(b)(6). If the judges for a district so vote, then all bankruptcy court appeals from
that district must be heard by the district court, notwithstanding the existence of a BAP. Id.
§ 158(a).
BAP judges are selected judges by, and for terms set by, each circuit’s judicial council.
BAP judges continue to hear cases as trial judges in addition to their BAP responsibilities. See
id. § 158(b)(1); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for
Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 632, 661 (2002); Thomas E. Carlson, The Case
for Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 1990 BYU L. REV. 545, 558.
153. Nash & Pardo, supra note 147, at 1757–58.
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FIGURE 1
BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE STRUCTURE FOR CORE PROCEEDINGS
Discretionary Final
Review:
Supreme Court

Second-Tier
Intermediate
Review:
Court of Appeals
First-Tier
Intermediate
Review:
(Possibility 1)

First-Tier
Intermediate
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A third reason expertise is likely in bankruptcy law is that few circuit
judges have experience in the area, let alone in deciding bankruptcy
cases as bankruptcy judges. As described below, this Article identified
only six circuit judges who ever served as bankruptcy judges (one of
whom was appointed to the court of appeals only in September of
2011).
Fourth, bankruptcy issues certainly arise with enough frequency to
make them valuable. Bankruptcy cases occupy a large portion of the
courts of appeals’ dockets.
Fifth, bankruptcy issues arise across the regional circuit courts of
appeals. Thus, there is plenty of opportunity for a court with a judge
with bankruptcy expertise to reap reputation benefits.
This Article’s empirical analysis seeks to identify all federal circuit
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judges who had prior experience as federal bankruptcy judges by
conducting a search of Federal Judicial Center data on federal judges154
for the term “bankruptcy.”
Six circuit judges met the criterion: Judge Conrad K. Cyr of the First
Circuit (who, while serving as a bankruptcy judge, also served as chief
judge of the original First Circuit BAP155); Judges Alice M. Batchelder,
R. Guy Cole, and Bernice B. Donald of the Sixth Circuit; Judge Michael
J. Melloy of the Eighth Circuit; and Judge John C. Porfilio of the Tenth
Circuit.156 (Table B1 in Appendix B summarizes the pertinent
information.) Because Judge Donald was appointed to the circuit only in
September of 2011,157 empirical analysis concerned the remaining five
judges.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This Part describes my empirical analysis. Section IV.A describes
the methodology by which I assembled three new primary datasets—
one for Judge Wilkins, one for Judge Breyer, and a third covering
former bankruptcy judges—and the coding of variables. Section IV.B
explores whether the evidence supports the hypotheses laid out at the
end of Part III.
A. Methodology
1. Primary Datasets158
Judge Wilkins—I compiled the Wilkins dataset by identifying all
criminal law cases decided by three-judge panels of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit during the calendar years 1990,
154. The data is available at Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, 1789-Present, FED.
JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2014).
155. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Cyr, Conrad Keefe, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=552&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Aug.
25, 2014) [hereinafter Judge Cyr Biography]. Congress originally authorized the federal circuits
to create BAPs under the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act. 8 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM
L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 170:6 (3d ed. 2014). Two circuits—
the First and the Ninth—accepted this invitation. The First Circuit disbanded its BAP in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87–88 (1982), which found the judicial organization provisions of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act to be unconstitutional. The First Circuit only reconstituted the BAP in
the 1990s. See Nash & Pardo, supra note 147, at 1779 n.122.
156. Until January 8, 1996, Judge Porfilio served under the name John P. Moore. For ease
of exposition, I refer to the judge simply as Judge Porfilio.
157. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Donald, Bernice Bouie, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=631&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Aug.
25, 2014).
158. As I explain below, I collected additional data to test various hypotheses.
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1991, 1992, and 1993,159 in which (i) Judge Wilkins served on the
panel, and (ii) a signed majority opinion was filed (iii) with Judge
Wilkins as part of that majority. I identified these cases by using
Boolean searches of Westlaw’s “federal criminal justice” database.160
The search generated 97 cases.161 Sixty-nine of those cases were
appeals of federal criminal convictions—on which the analysis focuses.
Only 5 of those cases were unpublished; this is consistent with the
notion that unpublished opinions are usually unsigned per curiam
opinions. Of the 69 cases, Judge Wilkins did not join the majority in
two.
The Wilkins dataset includes 67 federal criminal appeals cases in
which Judge Wilkins could have been assigned to author the majority
opinion. Of those, Judge Wilkins authored 41. Of the 67 federal
criminal appeals, 42 cases raised Guidelines issues. Of those 42 cases,
Judge Wilkins wrote the opinions in 30 cases. Tables B2 and B3 in
Appendix B break out these cases by year.
Judge Breyer—Along similar lines, I compiled the Breyer dataset by
identifying all criminal law cases decided by three-judge panels of the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit during the calendar
years 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1993, in which (i) Judge Breyer served on
the panel, and (ii) a signed majority opinion was filed (iii) with Judge
Breyer as part of that majority.
The Westlaw search generated 244 cases,162 of which 165 were
159. I began searching with 1990 since the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Commission and its Guidelines (at least as a matter of legislative delegation and separation
of powers) in its January 18, 1989 decision in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412
(1989). While cases decided in 1990 (or later) conceivably could have been argued while the
constitutionality of the Guidelines remained an open issue, in fact the earliest Fourth Circuit
case raising a Sentencing Guideline issue was argued on October 5, 1989. United States v.
Jones, 907 F.2d 456, 456, 457 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing defendant–appellants’ argument that
the district court incorrectly applied the federal Sentencing Guidelines). One state habeas case
was argued at the end of 1988 and still fell within the dataset. McDougall v. Dixon, 921 F.2d
518 (4th Cir. 1990) (argued Dec. 9, 1988).
160. Westlaw’s FCJ-CS database “includes federal cases that relate to criminal acts and the
investigation, prosecution, and punishment of crimes.” Practice Area Fundamentals: Criminal
Law Fundamentals, WESTLAW, http://lscontent.westlaw.com/images/content/CrimLaw10.pdf
(last visited Aug. 25, 2014).
161. The first search was: pr(“fourth circuit”) & wilkins & da(1990 1991 1992 1993) %
curiam. The search yielded 84 cases where Judge Wilkins was part of a three-judge panel.
Because the first search excluded signed opinions where an opinion cited another case and
indicated that that decision was “per curiam,” I performed a second search to correct for the first
search’s underinclusion: pr(“fourth circuit”) & wilkins & da(1990 1991 1992 1993) & curiam /s
(“u.s.” “s.ct.” “f.2d” “f.3d”). The second search yielded 13 more cases.
162. The first search was: pr(“first circuit”) & breyer & da(1990 1991 1992 1993) %
curiam. The search yielded 186 cases where Judge Breyer was part of a three-judge panel.
Because the first search excluded signed opinions where an opinion cited another case and
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criminal appeals—on which my analysis focuses. Only 2 of those cases
were unpublished. Of the 165 cases, Judge Breyer did not join the
majority opinion in 1 (pretrial release) case. In the end, then, there were
164 federal criminal cases in which Judge Breyer could have been
assigned the majority opinion; Judge Breyer made the opinion
assignment in all but 6 of those cases (and in all but 1 of the 75
Guidelines cases within that number). A breakdown of the number of
cases per year appears in Table B5 in Appendix B.
The Breyer dataset includes 164 federal criminal cases in which
Judge Breyer could have been assigned to author the majority opinion.
Of those, Judge Breyer authored 61. Of the 164 federal criminal cases,
75 cases raised Guidelines issues. Of those 75 cases, Judge Breyer
wrote the opinions in 34 cases. Tables B4 and B5 in Appendix B break
out these cases by year.
Former federal bankruptcy judges—I collected bankruptcy cases
that were decided through February of 2012. For Judges Cyr, Melloy,
and Porfilio, I performed searches in the Westlaw databases containing
bankruptcy cases from the relevant circuit.163 I searched for all threejudge panel cases164 that contained the word “bankruptcy”165 and in
which the judge in question was a member of the majority coalition. I
included all cases that originated in the bankruptcy courts; I also
included other cases that actually raised issues of bankruptcy law.166 I
included only signed opinions. In addition, I excluded cases in which
someone who had been a bankruptcy judge but at the time was only a
district judge (i.e., the judge had yet to be appointed to the circuit) sat
on a court of appeals case by designation.
For the Sixth Circuit—on which two former bankruptcy judges sat
during the relevant time period—I used a very similar approach. Here,
however, I included cases where a former bankruptcy judge was not
part of the majority, provided that the other former bankruptcy judge
was part of the majority.
indicated that that decision was “per curiam,” I performed a second search to correct for the first
search’s underinclusion: pr(“first circuit”) & breyer & da(1990 1991 1992 1993) & curiam /s
(“u.s.” “s.ct.” “f.2d” “f.3d”). The second search yielded 58 additional cases.
163. For example, for Judge Cyr—who serves on the First Circuit—the relevant database
was “FBKR-CS1.”
164. I did not include “en banc” cases; I did include cases that were originally designated
to be heard by three-judge panels, but where one of the original panel members (other than the
former bankruptcy judge) dropped out (for example, because of recusal or illness), leaving the
cases to be decided by panels of two judges.
165. The Westlaw bankruptcy databases include some cases that raise issues of liquidation
but not federal bankruptcy law.
166. For example, I included criminal cases in which the defendant had been convicted of
bankruptcy fraud, provided that the appeal raised an issue of bankruptcy law.
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Table B6 in Appendix B provides summary data on the number of
cases in which a former bankruptcy judge was part of the majority
coalition and in which a signed opinion was issued, and the number
(and percentage) of those cases in which the former bankruptcy judge
wrote the opinion. This information is provided both by circuit and
cumulatively.
2. Coding
The bankruptcy datasets include all federal bankruptcy cases in
which one of the former bankruptcy judges was part of the majority
panel coalition. The Guidelines datasets include all appeals from federal
convictions where either Judge Wilkins or Judge Breyer (depending
upon the circuit) was part of the majority panel coalition. For the
Guidelines datasets, I coded each case to indicate whether the case
involved the appeal of a federal criminal conviction. The 67 Wilkins
cases and 164 Breyer cases that did I then coded to indicate whether the
case raised any Sentencing Guideline issue.
For each of the cases in each of the datasets (i.e., both the Guidelines
and bankruptcy datasets), I coded: (i) the case name, citation, and date
of decision, (ii) the identities of the judges in the majority, (iii) the
identity of the judge who had opinion assignment responsibility,167
167. I coded the senior member of the majority coalition as the assigning judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006) (specifying that, after the chief judge, “[o]ther circuit judges of the court
in regular active service shall have precedence and preside according to the seniority of their
commissions”); see, e.g., 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 32.1(a)(1) (“The presiding judge [on the panel] assigns
opinion-writing responsibility.”); 8TH CIR. I.O.P. IV.A (“The presiding judge on the panel
assigns each case for preparation of a signed opinion, per curiam opinion, or a dispositive
order.”).
There are three bases on which one might object to my coding protocol. None of these
ultimately provides enough of a reason to vary from the protocol. First, some court rules (such
as those quoted earlier in this footnote) technically give the presiding judge and chief judge the
power to assign opinions even when the presiding judge is not part of the majority. See Cheng,
supra note 10, at 527 n.35 (noting that several circuits’ rules seem to allow this, and noting an
email from Judge Richard Posner confirming that “the Seventh Circuit allows the presiding
judge to assign majority opinions even if he or she is in dissent”). Still, in the few cases where
the presiding judge did not join the majority opinion, I coded the senior-most in the majority
coalition as the assigning judge: Even if some courts’ rules technically empower the presiding
judge to recommend assignments in such cases, I reason that the presiding judge will be unlikely
not to recommend assigning the opinion to the next-senior-most judge if in fact that judge wants
to write the opinion.
Second, some courts give the chief judge some opinion assignment power even if the chief
judge is not in the majority or indeed even on the panel. For example, Fourth Circuit internal
rules empower the chief judge to make assignments upon the recommendations of the
“presiding judge” of each panel. Id. at 530 n.53. In practice, however, the power given to the
chief judge may be largely symbolic: “anecdotally, the prerogative of the chief judge is rarely if
ever exercised.” Id.
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(iv) the party of the President who appointed the judge who had opinion
assignment responsibility, (v) the identity of the judge who drafted the
opinion, (v) whether the opinion was a published opinion, (vi) the
number of West headnotes in the case that pertained to the area of
expertise—i.e., the Guidelines or bankruptcy, as appropriate
(“Guidelines Headnotes” or “Bankruptcy Headnotes”), and (vii) the
ratio of the number of West headnotes in the case that pertained to
bankruptcy to the total number of West headnotes (“Guidelines
Headnote Ratio” or “Bankruptcy Headnote Ratio”).
I coded a few additional variables for the Guidelines datasets. With
respect to the Wilkins dataset, I coded whether Democrats constituted a
majority of the panel; whether (besides Judge Wilkins) another federal
district judge or former federal district judge sat on the panel; and
whether (besides Judge Wilkins) another former prosecutor sat on the
panel. With respect to the Breyer dataset, I coded whether Republicans
constituted a majority of the panel; whether any federal district judge or
former federal district judge sat on the panel; and whether any former
prosecutor sat on the panel.
Third, some courts of appeals have shifted to a system where the assigning judge assigns
two responsibilities in a case: first, responsibility for drafting a bench memorandum that all
judges who will hear the case share and, second, responsibility for drafting the opinion in the
case. See COHEN, supra note 9, at 72–73. Though the assigning judge may theoretically assign
the two responsibilities to different judges, in practice this is rarely the case (except where the
judge responsible for the bench memorandum is not part of the majority coalition). See id.
Commentators are divided over the extent to which the practice of shared bench memoranda
is growing (if not widespread). Compare Maxwell L. Stearns, Appellate Courts Inside and Out,
101 MICH. L. REV. 1764, 1766 (2003) (reviewing COHEN, supra note 9) (describing, based on
Cohen’s discussion, the preparation of a single bench memorandum for shared use by a panel as
“the increasingly common practice in several circuits”), with Don Songer, Book Review, 12 L.
& POL. BOOK REV. 373, 375 (2002) (reviewing COHEN, supra note 9) (criticizing Cohen for
creating the impression that the practice is more widespread than it really is, and noting that
Songer’s “own interviews suggest that this sharing of a bench memo is not used in the First,
Third, or Tenth Circuits,” and “[s]o rather than being a common practice, this procedure may be
largely limited to the Ninth Circuit”), and Wald, supra note 86, at 14 (noting the use of the
practice on the D.C. Circuit only for “monster cases”).
This debate does not affect my coding protocol. First, there is commentary indicating that
the First Circuit does not employ the practice. See Songer, supra, at 375; Kermit Lipez, Judges
and Their Law Clerks: Some Reflections, 22 ME. B.J. 112, 114 (2007) (discussing the opinion
assignment process on the First Circuit in a manner that seems inconsistent with prior
assignment of a single bench memorandum for the panel). My personal experience as a law
clerk for a Fourth Circuit judge during part of the period under study here indicates that the
Fourth Circuit did not employ the practice. Second, and more important, even if the system were
in use and assigning judges usually assigned opinions to the judges to whom they had
previously assigned responsibility to draft bench memoranda, similar incentives would guide
assigning judges to consider the same criteria—including whether or not the assignee judges had
expertise—in making assignments of bench memoranda. See supra note 86.
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The key dependent variable for all datasets was whether a judge with
the relevant expertise—either a Sentencing Commissioner or a former
bankruptcy judge—authored the opinion in the case.
3. Random Assignment of Opinions
Before proceeding further, a discussion of random assignment of
opinions is necessary. My research design assumes that the cases in the
dataset represent a random sample of Guidelines and bankruptcy cases
that came before the courts of appeals in question. While the common
belief is that courts of appeals assign cases and judges to panels at
random,168 Professor Matthew Hall has questioned the extent to which
court of appeals cases are in fact randomly assigned to panels.169 The
results of my study are subject to some question if a circuit did not
randomly assign Guidelines or bankruptcy cases to panels (and judges).
I sought to dispel this concern by collecting original datasets,
consisting of all bankruptcy cases—whether per curiam or signed, and
no matter who served on the panel—issued by each circuit during a
calendar year shortly after the former bankruptcy judge’s appointment
to the circuit. To evaluate Judge Wilkins’s service, I collected all federal
criminal cases—and, necessarily contained within that group, all
Guidelines cases—decided by the Fourth Circuit in 1990.170
With respect to the bankruptcy cases, for each circuit, I used a
binomial test to determine whether the former bankruptcy judge was
disproportionately represented on panels hearing bankruptcy cases.171

168. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and
the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257,
259 (1995) (describing the standard belief that federal courts randomly assign cases to judges);
COHEN, supra note 9, at 73.
169. See Hall, supra note 67, at 585.
170. Although I have not tested random assignment with respect to Judge Breyer in
Guidelines cases, I did test random assignment in bankruptcy cases on the First Circuit in 1993,
a year covered by my Guidelines study.
171. To determine the expected proportion, I first determined the number, m, of non-senior
circuit judges (including the former bankruptcy judge) during the year in question. Since (as the
data bear out) some panels include two non-senior circuit judges plus one other judge (whether a
senior circuit judge, or a district judge or judge from another circuit sitting by designation), I set
(m + 1) as the total pool of available judges. Then the number of possible combinations of nonsenior circuit judges on panels is F = (m + 1)C3, while the number of possible combinations of
two-judge contingents of which a lone former bankruptcy judge may possibly be a part is E =
mC2. Thus, the expected ratio of panels on which any one judge should sit if assignment is
random is:
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Table B7 in Appendix B presents the results. The Sixth Circuit data
regarding Judge Batchelder from both 1994 and 1998 suggests that we
should reject the null hypothesis of random distribution of cases to
panels. The other results are entirely consistent with random assignment
of cases. The data from assignment of Fourth Circuit federal criminal
and Guidelines appeals to Judge Wilkins—presented in Table B8 in
Appendix B—are also entirely consistent with random assignment of
cases to judges and panels.
Beyond random assignment of cases to judges, Professor Hall’s
research indicates that certain combinations of judges on panels are
more, or less, likely to issue per curiam opinions.172 Accordingly, I
examined whether the presence of a former bankruptcy judge—or Judge
Wilkins—on a panel changed the likelihood of the panel issuing a per
curiam decision.
With respect to the bankruptcy cases, with one exception, the data—
summarized in Table B9 in Appendix B—are clear across the circuits
that there is no statistically significant change in the likelihood of
having per curiam opinions issue. The one outlier is the percentage of
opinions decided per curiam in 1998 when Judge Batchelder sat on the
panel. Interestingly, however, this result goes in the opposite direction
of that which strategic application of the theory here would suggest.
One might expect that Judge Batchelder, as an expert in bankruptcy,
would tend to issue more signed bankruptcy opinions than would an
average judge, yet the 1998 data indicate that her presence on a panel
resulted in fewer than average signed bankruptcy opinions.
With respect to the Wilkins dataset, the data—summarized in Table
B10 in Appendix B—indicate that the inclusion of Judge Wilkins on a
panel clearly had no effect on the rate at which per curiam opinions
were issued in federal criminal appeals. In contrast, having Judge
Wilkins on a Guidelines panel reduced, with statistical significance, the
likelihood of a per curiam decision. Thus, the finding I describe below
that shows Judge Wilkins receiving disproportionate opinion
assignments in Guidelines cases may be due in part—but not

It is this ratio that is reflected in the 5th column of Tables B7 and B8 in Appendix B.
172. Professor Hall’s data reflect that some panel combinations were more likely than
others to issue unpublished opinions, see Hall, supra note 67, at 579, and unpublished opinions,
which tend to be per curiam.
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entirely173—to Judge Wilkins’s penchant to issue signed opinions in
those cases.174 Note, however, that assigning judges reasonably would
have known of this tendency, and presumably would have assigned
opinions to Judge Wilkins anticipating that he might be inclined to issue
signed opinions in Guidelines cases.175 Moreover, while the effect on
efficiency is unclear, having Judge Wilkins issue signed opinions would
certainly offer the Fourth Circuit legitimacy and reputation benefits.176
Thus, the disproportionate issuance of signed opinions by Judge
Wilkins in Guidelines cases is broadly consistent with the theory I
advance above in Parts I and II.
In sum, the data generally support the random assignment of cases to
judges. They also indicate that the presence of a judge with relevant
expertise on the panel did not, as a general matter, affect with statistical
significance the rate at which decisions were rendered per curiam.
Moreover, to the extent there is reason to doubt random assignment—in
particular of bankruptcy cases to Sixth Circuit judges who were
previously bankruptcy judges—the data show that, if anything, these
judges received fewer, not more, opinion assignments in bankruptcy
cases; this helps dispel the notion that, to the extent there was
nonrandom assignment, it was done to increase the ability of judges
with expertise to author opinions. On these findings, the next Section
describes the empirical tests of the hypotheses.

173. Consider that, while the difference between the rate at which Judge Wilkins, and the
general rate at which the Fourth Circuit, issued per curiam opinions is statistically significant,
the substantive difference—62.50% versus 74.71%—is not large. To put it in context, consider
that in the 1990 dataset Judge Wilkins wrote 10 of the 15 signed opinions issued when he was
on a Guidelines panel. If those panels had issued per curiam opinions at the rate generally
observed on the Fourth Circuit in Guidelines cases, then Wilkins’s panels would have generated
only around 10 signed opinions instead of 15. Assuming that all 5 of the opinions that would
now be per curiam were in fact written by Judge Wilkins, it still would be the case that Judge
Wilkins would have authored 5 of the 10 signed opinions. That 50.00% authorship rate is still
far in excess of the 33.33% rate one would expect with random opinion assignment, thus
indicating that the disproportionate rate at which Judge Wilkins wrote Guidelines opinions
results from more than just his penchant to issue signed opinions.
174. Cf. Stephen L. Wasby et al., The Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature and Functions, 76
JUDICATURE 29, 31 (1992) (explaining that the decision to issue an opinion per curiam is made
by the judge assigned to write the opinion).
175. In the 1990 dataset, Judge Wilkins was never the assigning judge in a Guidelines case.
176. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 549 (noting that opinions delivered by expert judges are
likely to garner more legitimacy).
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B. Results and Analysis
1. Hypothesis 1—Disproportionate Assignment of Opinions to Judges
with Expertise
Beginning with the Wilkins dataset, I first used a binomial test177 to
assess the likelihood that the extent to which Judge Wilkins was
assigned cases was simply the result of chance. The assignment to
Judge Wilkins of the opinion in 41 of 67 federal criminal cases178 in
which he could have written the opinion179—or 41 of 69 cases if one
includes the two cases where Judge Wilkins was on the panel but not in
the majority—differs, with statistical significance, from the expected
outcome, based upon truly random assignment, that Judge Wilkins
would be assigned the opinion in one-third of all cases.180 Similarly, the
assignment to Judge Wilkins of the opinion in 30 of 42 Guidelines
cases181 in which he could have written the opinion—or 30 of 43 cases
if one includes the lone such case where Judge Wilkins was on the panel
but not in the majority—differs, with statistical significance, from the
expected outcome of one-third.182
Second, I compared (i) the ratio of the number of (three-judge panel)
federal criminal cases and Guidelines cases decided in 1991 in which
Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion for the court to the total number of
(three-judge panel) cases decided in 1991 in which Judge Wilkins sat on
the panel, with (ii) the ratio of the number of (three-judge panel) cases
(of all subject matters) decided in 1991 in which Judge Wilkins wrote
the opinion for the court to the total number of (three-judge panel) cases

177. In keeping with other studies of opinion assignment, I do not employ regression
analysis here. While the dichotomy between whether or not a judge is assigned to write an
opinion may suggest use of logistic regressions, in fact that would not be appropriate: A logistic
regression would assume that the null hypothesis is that a judge is not assigned an opinion when
expertise is absent, when the equal workload norm suggests instead that a judge without
expertise should receive around one-third of opinion assignments in the absence of expertise.
The norm also means that even a judge with expertise in an area is highly unlikely to receive
responsibility to write the opinion in all cases in that area, again an outcome not contemplated
by a logistic regression.
178. See infra Appendix B, Table B2.
179. See Atkins, supra note 10, at 414–15 (using as the basis of analysis for each judge
“the ratio of the number of opinions written to the number of times that the judge participated in
the majority decision and was therefore eligible to write an opinion for the court”). See
generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 367 (“The equality to which the norm refers is
absolute equality, not that which is conditioned on the frequency with which any given justice is
a member of the conference vote coalition.”).
180. p < 0.01 in both cases.
181. See infra Appendix B, Table B3.
182. Again, p < 0.01 in both cases.
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decided in 1991 in which Judge Wilkins sat on the panel.183
Similar to the searches used to isolate the criminal justice cases in
which Judge Wilkins participated, I used two Westlaw searches in the
“CTA4” database (which contains all Fourth Circuit opinions) to find
all 1991 Fourth Circuit cases in which Judge Wilkins participated and
that yielded a signed majority opinion.184 Together, the two searches
yielded 53 total opinions. Judge Wilkins authored 22 of those 53
opinions.
I then performed a chi-squared test to determine whether the opinion
assignment rate to Judge Wilkins in appeals from federal convictions
was different, with statistical significance, from the overall rate at which
Judge Wilkins was assigned opinions to draft. (Here, in keeping with
the idea that, according to workload norms, Judge Wilkins should be
expected ultimately to receive approximately one-third of all cases in
which he sat on the panel, I included cases where Judge Wilkins was
not part of the majority coalition.) Panel A of Table B11 in Appendix B
summarizes the data and results.
A similar test confirms that the assignment rate to Judge Wilkins in
Guidelines cases differs, with statistical significance, from the rate in
cases overall. This is summarized in Panel B of Table B11 in Appendix
B.
I also compared the assignment of both federal criminal appeals and
Guidelines cases to Judge Wilkins when Judge Wilkins was the only
Republican appointee on the panel, whether there was a current district
judge or another former district judge on the panel, and whether there
was another former prosecutor on the panel.185 None of these factors
had any statistically significant effect on the disproportionate rate at
which Judge Wilkins was assigned federal criminal appeals and
Guidelines cases.
I performed similar analyses on the Breyer database. I first used a
binomial test to assess the likelihood that the extent to which Judge
Breyer was assigned cases was simply the result of chance. The
assignment to Judge Breyer of the opinion in 61 of 164 federal criminal
cases in which he could have written the opinion186 (or 61 of 165 cases
183. See infra Appendix B, Table B11.
184. The first search was: da(1991) & wilkins % curiam. It yielded 66 documents. Of those
cases, Judge Wilkins did not sit on the panel in 4 cases, 10 cases were decided en banc, and 1
case was decided per curiam (and was pulled up because of the misspelling “curium”).
Eliminating those 15 cases left 51 cases.
The second search was: da(1991) & wilkins & curiam /s “u.s.” “s.ct.” “f.2d” “f.3d”. It
yielded 6 documents, 2 of which were en banc cases and 2 of which were per curiam opinions,
thus leaving 2 additional opinions.
185. See infra Appendix B, Table B22.
186. See infra Appendix B, Table B4.
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if one includes the lone case where Judge Breyer was on the panel but
not in the majority) does not differ with statistical significance from the
expected outcome, based upon truly random assignment, that Judge
Breyer would be assigned the opinion in one-third of all cases.187
However, the assignment to Judge Breyer of the opinion in 34 of 75
Guidelines cases in which he could have written the opinion188 does
differ, with statistical significance, from the expected outcome of onethird.189
I next compared (i) the ratio of the number of (three-judge panel)
federal criminal cases and Guidelines cases decided in 1991 in which
Judge Breyer wrote the opinion for the court to the total number of
(three-judge panel) cases decided in 1991 in which Judge Breyer sat on
the panel, with (ii) the ratio of the number of (three-judge panel) cases
(of all subject matters) decided in 1991 in which Judge Breyer wrote the
opinion for the court to the total number of (three-judge panel) cases
decided in 1991 in which Judge Breyer sat on the panel.190
I again used two Westlaw searches—this time in the “CTA1”
database (which contains all First Circuit opinions)—to find all 1991
First Circuit cases in which Judge Breyer participated and that yielded a
signed majority opinion.191 Together, the two searches yielded 135 total
opinions. Judge Breyer authored 43 of those 135 opinions.192
I then performed a chi-squared test to determine whether the rate of
opinion assignment to Judge Breyer in appeals from federal convictions
was different, with statistical significance, from the overall rate at which
Judge Breyer was assigned opinions to draft. In keeping with the idea
that, according to workload norms, Judge Breyer should be expected
ultimately to be assigned approximately one-third of all cases in which
he sat on the panel, I included cases where Judge Breyer was not part of
the majority coalition. Panel A of Table B12 in Appendix B summarizes
the data and results, which have statistical significance, although only at
the 10% level.193

187. p > 0.32.
188. See infra Appendix B, Table B5.
189. p < 0.04.
190. See infra Appendix B, Table B12.
191. The first search was: da(1991) & breyer % curiam. It yielded 119 documents. Of those
cases, Judge Breyer did not sit on the panel in 3 cases, 4 cases were decided en banc, and 2
cases were decided by unsigned “Order of the Court.” These 2 cases were picked up because
they were not denominated “per curiam.” Eliminating these 9 cases left 110 cases.
The second search was: da(1991) & breyer & curiam /s “u.s.” “s.ct.” “f.2d”. It yielded 35
additional opinions.
192. See infra Appendix B, Table B12.
193. Id.
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A similar test confirms that the assignment rate to Judge Breyer in
Guidelines cases differs, with strong statistical significance, from the
rate in cases overall. This is summarized in Panel B of Table B12 in
Appendix B.
I also compared the assignment of both federal criminal appeals and
Guidelines cases to Judge Breyer when Judge Breyer was the only
Democrat appointee on the panel, and whether there was another former
prosecutor on the panel.194 Neither of these factors had any statistically
significant effect on the disproportionate rate at which Judge Breyer
was assigned federal criminal appeals and Guidelines cases.
I tested the statistical significance of the predominant assignment of
opinions to former bankruptcy judges using a binomial test. The results,
set forth in Table B13 in Appendix B, make clear that former
bankruptcy judges have received opinion assignments in bankruptcy
cases in excess of the 33.33% of the time that would be expected if
opinion assignment were random. The results are highly statistically
significant for opinion assignment on the First, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits, and across the circuits cumulatively, surveying the First, Sixth,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.195
Because of the presence (for at least part of the time under study) of
two former bankruptcy judges on its bench, the Sixth Circuit results are
more complicated. Table B14 in Appendix B presents results when we
consider the judges separately and counts all cases where that judge was
in the majority. This count includes cases where both former bankruptcy
judges, Judge Batchelder and Judge Cole, were part of the majority
coalition; Judge Cole received the opinion assignment in all 4 of these
cases. Judge Cole’s assignment rate is different, with statistical
significance, from what one would expect under random assignment;
Judge Batchelder’s rate was not statistically significant, though it
approaches significance at the 10% level.196
The results are slightly different if we continue to consider the
judges separately but count only those cases where one judge, and not
the other, was in the majority—if we eliminate from both tallies, the 4
cases where both judges were part of the majority. (It may make sense
to count this way in order to avoid cases where former bankruptcy
judges have a cumulative two-thirds chance of receiving the opinion
assignment.) As Table B15 in Appendix B indicates, Judge Batchelder’s
number after this adjustment is significant at the 10% level, while Judge
194. Another plausible control variable—whether or not there was a current district judge
or a former district judge on the panel—was positive in every case in the dataset. And only two
of the 164 cases were unpublished.
195. See infra Appendix B, Table B13.
196. See infra Appendix B, Table B14.
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Cole—having lost 4 opinion assignments—now only approaches
significance at that level.197
Finally, we may tally the results across the Sixth Circuit in two
ways. First, we include all cases in the dataset; this is reflected in the
top row of Table B16 in Appendix B. The bottom row excludes the 4
cases where both former bankruptcy judges were part of the majority
coalition.198 The results are statistically significant either way.
When we aggregate all the cases across circuits, the predominant
assignment of cases to former bankruptcy judges differs, with statistical
significance, from what we would expect were random assignment at
work. This is shown in the last row of Table B13 in Appendix B. In
short, while the picture in the Sixth Circuit is not as clear, still the
overall bankruptcy data provide substantial support for Hypothesis 1, as
do the Guidelines data.
2. Hypothesis 2—Effect of Introduction of Guidelines
on Assignment of Opinions
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the heightened levels of opinion
assignment to a judge with expertise in the relevant area are a result of
that judge having that expertise. In other words, Hypothesis 2 suggests
that, if we could somehow observe a version of the judge without that
expertise but the same in all other respects, we would not observe
heightened levels of opinion assignment. Ordinarily it is not possible to
observe two versions of the same judge—one with relevant expertise
and the other without. In the setting of the assignment of federal
criminal appeals to the Sentencing Commissioner, however, we do have
such an opportunity. I previously found evidence of disproportionate
opinion assignment to both Judges Wilkins and Breyer. I now
investigate whether that disparity existed in the assignment of federal
criminal cases prior to the advent of the Guidelines. I do this by
examining a time period before the application of the Guidelines, at
which point Guidelines expertise would have been rather useless for
court cases. For comparison with post-Guidelines assignment rates, I
rely upon the year 1988 (bearing in mind that the Guidelines did not
take effect until Nov. 1, 1987, and no Guidelines cases reached the
Fourth Circuit until 1989). Again, I used two searches in the FCJ-CS
library to find all appeals from federal convictions in which Judge
Wilkins participated as a panel member.199 Where he sat on the panel,
197. See infra Appendix B, Table B15.
198. See infra Appendix B, Table B16.
199. Both searches were conducted in FCJ-CS. The first search was: pr(“fourth circuit”) &
wilkins & da(1988) % curiam. It yielded 13 federal criminal appeals heard by three-judge panels
that included Judge Wilkins. Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion in 5 of those cases.
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Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion in 6 of the 14 federal criminal appeals
(42.86%) where he sat on the panel that were decided in 1988.200 I note
that this rate is substantially below the comparable rate of 41 of 69 cases
(59.42%) during the period 1990–1993.201
I then used two searches to identify all Fourth Circuit cases decided
by signed opinion in 1988 (in all subject-matter areas) where Judge
Wilkins sat on the panel.202 A Fisher’s exact test (with results
summarized in Table B17 in Appendix B) confirms that, unlike the
result in 1991 (presented in Panel A of Table B11 in Appendix B), the
rate at which Judge Wilkins was assigned opinions in federal criminal
cases was not different, with statistical significance, from the overall
rate at which he was assigned opinions.203 (Here, as above, I include all
cases where Judge Wilkins was on the panel, whether or not he was part
of the majority coalition.) This provides strong support for Hypothesis
2.
I similarly test whether the heightened assignment of federal
criminal opinions to Judge Breyer is an artifact of the advent of the
Guidelines. For comparison with post-Guidelines assignment rates, I
again rely upon the year 1988. Again, I used two searches in the FCJCS library to find all appeals from federal convictions in which Judge
Breyer participated as a panel member.204 Judge Breyer wrote the
opinion in 8 of the 32 signed federal criminal appeals (25.00%) where
he sat on the panel that were decided in 1988.205 I note that this rate is
substantially below the comparable rate of 61 out of 164 cases (37.20%)
for the period 1990–1993.206
I then searched for all First Circuit cases (in all subject-matter areas)
decided by signed opinion in 1988 where Judge Breyer sat on the
The second search was: pr(“fourth circuit”) & da(1988) & wilkins & curiam /s “u.s.” “s.ct.”
“f.2d”. It yielded 1 case. Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion in that case.
200. See infra Appendix B, Table B17.
201. See infra Appendix B, Table B2.
202. Both searches were conducted in CTA4. The first search was: da(1988) & wilkins %
curiam. It produced 72 cases. Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion in 21 of those cases.
The second search was: da(1988) & wilkins & curiam /s “u.s.” “s.ct.” “f.2d”. It yielded 3
cases. Judge Wilkins wrote the opinion in 2 of those cases.
203. See infra Appendix B, Table B17.
204. Both searches were conducted in FCJ-CS. The first search was: pr(“first circuit”) &
breyer & da(1988) % curiam. It yielded 28 cases. Judge Breyer wrote the opinion in 7 of those
cases.
The second search was: pr(“first circuit”) & da(1988) & breyer & curiam /s “u.s.” “s.ct.”
“f.2d”. It yielded 4 federal criminal cases that produced signed opinions; 1 was authored by
Judge Breyer.
205. See infra Appendix B, Table B18.
206. See infra Appendix B, Table B4.
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panel.207 A chi-squared test (with results summarized in Table B18 in
Appendix B) confirms that Judge Breyer was not assigned opinions in
federal criminal cases at a rate that differed, with statistical significance,
from his overall assignment rate. This result differs substantially from
the analogous and statistically significant result obtained from 1991 (see
Panel A of Table B12), and thus provides support for Hypothesis 2.
3. Hypothesis 3—Effect of Extent of Legal Issues Raising Expertise on
Assignment of Opinions
Having found evidence of disproportionate opinion assignment to
judges with relevant expertise in both the Guidelines and bankruptcy
arenas, I turn to the question of whether that disparity grows when the
number of legal issues going to a judge’s expertise, and the ratio of such
legal issues to total issues in a case, gets larger. I look for statistical
significance in the rate at which cases are assigned to the expert judge
based upon the ratio of headnotes that correspond with the expert’s field
to those that do not—that is, Guidelines headnotes ratio or Bankruptcy
headnote ratio, as the case may be.208 In all settings, I group cases by
whether the relevant headnote ratio is (i) less than or equal to one-third,
(ii) greater than one-third but less than or equal to two-thirds, or
(iii) greater than two-thirds.
Two of the three datasets provide support for Hypothesis 3. The
Wilkins dataset provides the weakest support. As summarized in Table
B19 in Appendix B, 8 of 9 cases (88.9%) with a Guidelines headnote
ratio of one-third or less, 6 of 8 cases (75.0%) with a ratio of more than
one-third and two-thirds or less, and 16 of 25 (64.0%) cases with a ratio
in excess of two-thirds were assigned to Judge Wilkins. There is no
statistically significant difference in the assignment rate.
The Breyer dataset tells a different story. As summarized in Table
B20 in Appendix B, while only 6 of 20 cases (30.0%) with a Guidelines
headnote ratio of one-third or less and 8 of 22 cases (36.4%) with a ratio
of more than one-third and two-thirds or less were assigned to Judge
Breyer, 20 of 33 (60.6%) cases with a ratio in excess of two-thirds were
assigned to Judge Breyer. The difference in assignment rate is
statistically significant.
The results for the bankruptcy datasets, presented in Table B21 in
Appendix B, also support Hypothesis 3. While only 20 of 57 cases
207. Both searches were conducted in CTA1. The first search was: da(1988) & breyer %
curiam. It produced 102 cases. Judge Breyer wrote the opinion in 33 of those cases.
The second search was: da(1988) & breyer & curiam /s “u.s.” “s.ct.” “f.2d”. It yielded 17
cases; Judge Breyer wrote the opinion in 4 of those cases.
208. West provides headnotes for all published decisions, and in recent years for some
unpublished decisions as well.
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(35.1%) with a Bankruptcy headnote ratio of one-third or less were
assigned to former bankruptcy judges, 28 of 50 cases (56.0%) with a
ratio of more than one-third and up to two-thirds were assigned to
expert judges, and 135 of 238 cases (56.7%) with a ratio of more than
two-thirds wind up in the hands of experts. Again, the difference is
statistically significant.
Overall, then, the data indicate substantial, but not unequivocal,
support for Hypothesis 3.
4. Hypothesis 4—Party Affiliation and Assignment of Opinions
I turn now to examine the effect of party affiliation on opinion
assignment. In the context of the Guidelines cases, I perform the
empirical testing solely on the Wilkins data because Judge Breyer was
Chief Judge in nearly all the cases in the Breyer database and therefore
was responsible for nearly all opinion assignments. The results are
presented in Table B22 in Appendix B. For both federal criminal cases
and Guidelines cases, assignment rates remain, with statistical
significance, similarly disproportionate.209 In addition, there is no
statistical significance between the rate at which judges appointed by
Democratic presidents, as opposed to judges appointed by Republican
presidents, assign opinions to Judge Wilkins.210 Thus, as the theory
predicts, the null hypothesis—that opinion assignment rates do not vary
with statistical significance depending upon whether the assigning judge
was appointed by a Democratic or Republican president—cannot be
rejected.
The results for the combined bankruptcy dataset are presented in
Table B23 in Appendix B. Again, in any setting, the null hypothesis—
that opinion assignment rates do not vary with statistical significance
depending upon whether the assigning judge was appointed by a
Democratic or Republican president—cannot be rejected. Assignment
rates generally remain disproportionate regardless of whether a
Democratic or Republican appointee has opinion assignment
responsibility.
Notably, all but one of the judges under study—Judge Cole—were
appointed by Republican presidents. To gain further insight into the role
of party affiliation, I reverse the “polarity” of Judge Cole’s assignors
and ask not whether an assignor was appointed by a Democratic or
Republican president, but whether the assignor was appointed by a
judge who was appointed by a president of the same party as the
president who appointed the former bankruptcy judge to the circuit.
209. See infra Appendix B, Table B22.
210. Id.
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Across all circuits, former bankruptcy judges author 54 of 105 opinions
(51.43%) where the assigning judge was appointed by a president
different from the party of the president who appointed the authoring
judge, and 129 of 240 opinions (53.75%) in cases where the assigning
judge was appointed by a president different from the party of the
president who appointed the authoring judge. The results still do not
divulge any statistically significant difference in opinion assignment
rates.211
In summary, the results yielded do not refute Hypothesis 4.
5. Hypothesis 5—Assignment of Cases and Judicial Panel Rank
The final hypothesis suggests that the hierarchical position, within
the majority coalition, of a judge with relevant expertise should not
substantially affect opinion assignment rates. I test the hypothesis in the
context of the Wilkins dataset212 and the bankruptcy dataset.
The results for the Wilkins dataset, broken down for federal criminal
appeals and Guidelines cases, are presented in Table B24 in Appendix
B. The rate at which Judge Wilkins self-assigns criminal appeals is
exactly what one would expect in the abstract: one-third.213 This can be
explained by the fact that judges may be more reluctant to self-assign.214
Overall, moreover, Judge Wilkins receives opinion assignments in
federal criminal appeals and Guidelines cases at rates different—with
statistical significance—from the otherwise expected one-third
regardless of hierarchical position, and the rates do not vary from one
another, with statistical significance, depending upon hierarchical
position.215
The results for the bankruptcy dataset are presented in Table B25 in
Appendix B.216 Consistent with the hypothesis, disproportionate opinion
assignment persists, for the most part, regardless of the hierarchical
position of the expert judge. Moreover, we are again unable, in any
setting, to reject the null hypothesis that opinion assignment rates do not
vary with a former bankruptcy judge’s hierarchical position on a
judicial panel.
In short, the support for Hypothesis 5 is fairly strong.

211. Chi-squared test p = 0.691.
212. Because Judge Breyer was Chief Judge for almost every case in the Breyer database,
he was almost always the senior member of every panel.
213. See infra Appendix B, Table B24.
214. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
215. See infra Appendix B, Table B24.
216. In the event that a judge in the senior-most or middle position on the panel was not
part of the majority, I adjusted the rank of the other judges accordingly.
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V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The conclusions in the preceding Part provide support for the
hypotheses laid out at the end of Part II. First, judges with expertise
generally receive a disproportionate share of opinion assignments.
Second, the natural experiment provided by the Guidelines allows us to
conclude that acquiring relevant expertise does indeed result in more
frequent opinion assignment. Third, the presence in a case of many
issues going to a judge’s expertise—or the presence of a greater
proportion of such issues to the total number of issues raised in the
case—generally increases the likelihood that that judge will draft the
opinion. Fourth, the ideological differences of the assigning judge and
an expert judge generally do not reduce the disproportionate assignment
of cases to the expert judge. And, fifth, expert judges receive
disproportionately more opinion assignments regardless of the
hierarchical position they fill on three-judge panels.
The Sixth Circuit bankruptcy case data—and especially the data
involving Judge Batchelder—are the most difficult for the theory. It
bears emphasizing, as well, that the Sixth Circuit was the one court that
empirical testing seemed to suggest might not have been randomly
assigning bankruptcy opinions.217 However, it is also important to bear
in mind that, if the Sixth Circuit were using nonrandom assignment to
channel more bankruptcy cases to panels where a former bankruptcy
judge could author the opinion, then one would expect the proportion of
opinions in such bankruptcy cases authored by former bankruptcy
judges to be higher than the expected one-third. Yet the data indicate
that the proportion is sometimes not significantly different from onethird. This suggests that, if there is nonrandom assignment of cases, it is
not done to allow more opinion-writing by expert judges.
Despite the general support for the notion that judges with expertise
receive heightened levels of opinion assignment, the data show that
there is considerable heterogeneity across circuits and judges in the
treatment of expert judges. In the bankruptcy context, Judge Cyr authors
a far greater percentage of bankruptcy case opinions than does any other
former bankruptcy judge.218 Perhaps this is because Judge Cyr’s
expertise outstrips the other former bankruptcy judges’ expertise in
unique and valuable ways. Even before serving as a bankruptcy judge,
217. See discussion supra Subsection IV.A.3. The Sixth Circuit has not been immune from
controversy regarding random assignment of cases to panels in recent years. See Tracey E.
George & Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitudinal Theory and Possible Paradox
of Managerial Judging, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2–4 (2008) (noting the Sixth Circuit controversy
surrounding allegations that the chief judge manipulated the assignment process and deviated
from random assignment).
218. See infra Appendix B, Table B23.
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Judge Cyr served as a bankruptcy referee under the old pre-Bankruptcy
Code “Bankruptcy Act of 1898” era.219 In addition, he served as chief
judge of the original First Circuit BAP.220 No other bankruptcy judge
later elevated to the circuit can lay claim to anything approaching that
level of experience.
In the Guidelines context, the expertise that Judge Wilkins and Judge
Breyer both enjoyed seems to manifest itself in terms of opinion
assignment in slightly different ways. As borne out by both binomial
and chi-squared tests, Judge Wilkins received a statistically
disproportionate number of opinions in federal criminal cases, and even
more so in Guidelines cases when he sat on the panel in such cases.221
With respect to Judge Breyer, the binomial test did not indicate that the
higher assignment rate in federal criminal cases was statistically
significant.222 However, the chi-squared test did find statistical
significance, and both the binomial and chi-squared tests confirm the
statistical significance of the disproportionate rate at which Judge
Breyer was assigned opinions in Guidelines cases.223 With respect to
both federal criminal and Guidelines cases, Judge Wilkins received a
higher proportion of opinion assignments than did Judge Breyer.224
This result is broadly consistent with Judge Wilkins’s more
extensive experience in general criminal law. As a Commissioner who
participated in the drafting of the original Guidelines, Judge Breyer also
had experience that few other judges could claim. At the same time,
there are reasons to temper, at least as compared to Judge Wilkins, our
expectations about the frequency of opinion assignment to Judge
Breyer. For one thing, during the entire period of the study, Judge
Breyer was the chief judge of the First Circuit. That means that, in every
case, he held the prerogative to assign opinions. As chief judge, Judge
Breyer may have been concerned about the appearance of assigning too
many opinions in an area to himself, and also about the effect of such
self-assignment on the court’s legitimacy. Second, Judge Breyer does
not have as strong a background in criminal law as does Judge
Wilkins.225 Rather, Judge Breyer seems to have brought an
219. See Judge Cyr Biography, supra note 155.
220. See id.; supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting Judge Cyr served as chief
judge of the original First Circuit BAP).
221. See discussion supra Subsection IV.B.1.
222. See discussion supra Subsection IV.B.1.
223. See discussion supra Subsection IV.B.1.
224. See infra Appendix B, Tables B2–B5.
225. As noted above, Judge Breyer served briefly as counsel in the Watergate prosecutions,
but this pales in comparison to Judge Wilkins’s extensive experience in criminal law before
ascending to the bench.
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administrative law expertise to bear on the Guidelines.226 But many
Guidelines cases are likely also to raise unrelated issues of criminal law.
Judge Breyer’s lack of a general criminal law expertise might have
deterred him from taking on such cases, for fear that expertise that
would help him deal with part of the case would not help him with the
rest of the case at all;227 the efficiency benefit would indeed be limited.
In the end, then, that Judge Breyer’s expertise was restricted more to the
Guidelines squares nicely with Judge Breyer being assigned opinions at
a lower rate than Judge Wilkins, and also with his being more likely to
write the opinion in cases with larger proportions of Guidelines
headnotes.
The validation of the various hypotheses offers strong support for the
theoretical explanation for expertise-based opinion assignment
advanced in Parts I and II. No alternate explanation satisfies all the
observations here as well as the proffered theory does. For example, one
might suggest that the high rate of assignment of opinions in Guidelines
appeals to Judge Wilkins is in part due to Judge Wilkins’s prosecutorial
experience.228 Two points belie this explanation. First, the data do not
suggest that district judges who had prosecutorial experience were
substantially more likely to be assigned Guidelines opinions. Second,
the power of this explanation is undercut by the comparatively low rate
at which Judge Wilkins was assigned criminal cases before the advent
of the Guidelines,229 despite the prosecutorial experience he had, even
then.
With respect to Judge Breyer, one might turn to Professor Tracey
George’s scholarship finding that circuit judges with prior legal
academic experience tend to be assigned more cases than their
colleagues.230 But the suggestion that this explains the higher rates at
which Judge Breyer is assigned Guidelines cases is undercut231 by both
226. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting Justice Breyer’s expertise in
administrative law).
227. See supra Subsection II.B.2.b (arguing that expertise is more valuable when it arises
in a case where it can be used to dispose of all the issues in the case).
228. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (noting Judge Wilkins’s experience as
solicitor in South Carolina). Judge M. Blane Michael also had such experience, but was
appointed to the Fourth Circuit only at the tail end of the time period studied. See Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges: Michael, M. Blane, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/
nGetInfo?jid=1632&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Aug. 26, 2014) (noting that
Judge Michael began serving on the Fourth Circuit in 1993).
229. See infra Appendix B, Table B17.
230. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 41–42, 50–54 (2001)
(contending legal academics’ “individualistic approach to judging should increase their
inclination to write signed, published opinions”).
231. Also suggestive that it is Judge Breyer’s Sentencing Commission experience, and not
his academic experience, that explains the results here is the finding that a judge’s prior
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(i) the fact that the study here looked at proportions of cases in which
opinions were assigned, not absolute numbers; and (ii) the fact that the
rate at which Judge Breyer was assigned opinions in federal criminal
cases increased once the Guidelines were effective.232
One might argue that expert judges penned large numbers of cases in
their areas of expertise not because of expertise in the area, but because
of plain interest in the area (perhaps combined with other judges’ lack
of interest in the area).233 While this explanation may have some
validity, it leaves open the question as to why, for example, other judges
with prosecutorial experience would not have similar interest in
handling Guidelines cases. It is also hard to believe that assigning
judges, even if they did “award” cases to satisfy certain judges’
“interests,” did not take into account the potential benefits from having
experts draft opinions.
The results here have implications for other scholarship on
specialization and opinion assignment, and on judicial review of the
Sentencing Guidelines. First, the high rate at which Judge Wilkins was
assigned opinions in federal criminal cases is consistent with Professor
Cheng’s finding about Judge Wilkins’ strong specialization in criminal
law cases.234 Indeed, Professor Cheng’s measure of Judge Wilkins’
affinity for federal criminal cases was the highest among all circuit
judges for any subject in his study.235 However, the findings here draw
into question whether a similar study conducted before the Guidelines
took effect (Professor Cheng’s study spanned the years 1995–2005)
would have produced a similar result.
Second, that the data here indicate that political affiliations did not
play a significant role in opinion assignment in Guidelines cases draws
into question the need to ensure partisan balance in Guidelines cases.
Based upon their finding that district judges tend to apply their
experience as a law professor was not likely to affect how she ruled on the constitutionality of
the Guidelines pre-Mistretta. Sisk et al., supra note 114, at 1479–80. Extrapolating from this, it
seems unlikely that Judge Breyer, as a former law professor, assigned Guidelines opinions to
himself in order to secure particular policy outcomes.
232. With respect to Judge Breyer, at least some of this effect may be because only after
the Guidelines took effect was Judge Breyer the chief judge, and thus empowered to assign the
opinion in every case in which he participated.
233. See Cheng, supra note 10, at 527 (“[T]he assigning judge may distribute opinions
based on the panel members’ special expertise or interest.” (emphasis added)).
234. See id. at 541 (noting Judge Wilkins’s “overwhelming” number of criminal and
postconviction opinions).
235. See id. at 564 (providing empirical data demonstrating that Judge Wilkins’s
specialization rate vis-à-vis other judges). Judge Posner received a higher absolute score for
criminal law, but that score was negative in sign, which indicated Judge Posner’s aversion to
criminal law cases. See id. at 565.
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discretion under the Guidelines with an eye to the ideology of the circuit
to which their decision would be appealed,236 Professors Max
Schanzenbach and Emerson Tiller suggest institutionalizing ideological
diversity “for every sentencing event by ensuring that for any criminal
sentencing the lower court and higher court not share a uniform political
(partisan) orientation.”237 To be sure, the instant study looks at opinion
assignment in Guidelines cases, not the extent to which voting is
ideological. In addition, the study here looks at the time period largely
before the time period that Professors Schanzenbach and Tiller studied,
a time period that includes years that they do not study because of the
large technical issues that remained outstanding.238 Still, the findings
here certainly do not provide any additional reason to believe that it is
important to mandate partisan balance in Guidelines cases.
CONCLUSION
This Article provides a theory for expertise-based assignment of
judicial opinions. It has tested that theory, with success, in the context
of the assignment of federal criminal and Sentencing Guidelines cases
to expert judges who drafted those Guidelines, and also in the context of
the assignment of bankruptcy cases to judges who previously served as
federal bankruptcy judges.
In future research, I plan to expand this research in three ways. First,
I hope to investigate additional observable implications of the expertisebased theory of opinion assignment advanced here. For example, the
theory predicts that the court will garner reputation benefits through the
assignment of opinions in that area to experts. One way that reputation
benefit might manifest itself is through citation of those expertly drafted
opinions by other courts. Indeed, David Klein and Darby Morrisroe
have found that Judge Wilkins’s and, to a lesser extent, Judge Breyer’s
opinions are cited rather extensively, and they speculate that this is the
result of the judges’ Guidelines experience.239 I hope to investigate the
issue more methodically, with an eye to the reputation theory
enunciated here. I also hope to look at judicial citations of other writings
by these judges—writings other than opinions—in the area of the
Guidelines.
Second, I plan to further test the theory in other settings. It would be
interesting, in particular, to investigate settings where expertise-based
236. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 32–33.
237. Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 113, at 744–45.
238. See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 98, at 35 (“We begin with 1992 because the
Guidelines were upheld by the Supreme Court in 1989 and the permissibility of certain grounds
for departures became clearer in the early 1990s.”).
239. See Klein & Morrisroe, supra note 2, at 381–82.
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assignment might compete more directly with ideological interests.
Finally, the theory of expertise-based opinion assignment advanced
here is but the first step in a broader theoretical understanding of the
factors that influence judicial opinion assignment. I plan to advance
such an understanding in future work.
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APPENDIX A: A FORMAL UTILITY-BASED MODEL OF OPINION
ASSIGNMENT
A. The Basic Model
I develop a utility-based model of opinion assignment. I begin with a
simple court that hears a case en banc, and has an exogenous
determination as to who drafts the opinion in the case. I build up to a
court that has a docket of cases, and a generalized rule for determining
who enjoys the prerogative to assign responsibility for drafting the
opinion in each case. I also allow for courts that hear cases in panels
consisting of less than the entire complement of judges. Where a docket
of cases is to be assigned, I assume a court norm that expects each to
draft roughly the same number of opinions.
Consider a court C. Let J denote the set of m judges who sit on C;
J = { j1, j2, j3, . . . , jm}.
Let us begin with a very basic example: The court, which hears all
cases en banc, has heard a case c. One of the judges—say j*—will write
the opinion in the case. Each judge brings different experiential and
ideological backgrounds to the table. Accordingly, depending on which
judge drafts the opinion in c, the opinion will offer varying costs and
benefits—in terms of the time it takes to prepare the opinion, legal
legitimacy and reputation, and ideological legitimacy and reputation—
to the court.
The time it takes the authoring judge to prepare the opinion imposes
a cost on the court by depleting its limited resources. The time will be a
function of the authoring judge: t(j*).
The time that a judge spends drafting an opinion is an expenditure of
a resource. Presumably, the court hopes to recoup something for that
investment (or at least minimize any loss) by virtue of the quality of the
resulting opinion. An opinion may inure to a court’s benefit by
emphasizing the court’s legal acumen and skill; it may also inure to the
court’s benefit by emphasizing the court’s ideological stance.
Let the legal value benefits offered by judge j* drafting the opinion
in case c be represented by L(j*). Let the ideological value benefits
offered by judge j* drafting the opinion in case c be represented by I(j*).
Now let us consider the utility that a judge—say without loss of
generality j1—gets from having j* author the opinion in c. This utility
will include a combination of these five values. Each judge, however, is
likely to weigh the factors differently. Accordingly, for judge j1, the
utility of having judge j* draft the opinion will depend upon
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-γ1(j1)t(j*) + γ2(j1)L(j*) + γ3(j1)I(j*),
where γ1, γ2, and γ3 measure the relative weights that j1 assigns to each
cost/benefit with respect to case c.
Beyond this, j1’s own utility arising directly from j*’s authorship
aside, j1 may be concerned about how judges other than judge j1
(including j*240) will react to j*’s authorship. Having judge j* write the
opinion in c will provide utility of various levels to the various judges
on the court. The judges may have a view on whether the associated
costs and benefits are desirable. And, quite apart from that, they may
have a view on whether j* is happy writing the opinion and on whether
they would have preferred writing the opinion themselves. Call this
utility s; s is also a function of j*, as well as of j1: s(j1, j*). There is also a
weight, γ4, that j1 attaches to that factor.
Then the utility drawn by j1 from having j* author the opinion in case
c is
u(j1, j*) = -γ1(j1)t(j*) + γ2(j1)L(j*) + γ3(j1)I(j*) + γ4s(j1, j*).
More generally, for any judge jk and j* (both elements of J),
u(jk, j*) = -γ1t(j*) + γ2L(j*) + γ3I(j*) + γ4s(jk, j*).
The various weighting factors γr are functions of jk.
Now say that the court considers two cases c1 and c2. Now the γr are
functions not only of jk, but also of the case:
j*),

u(c1, jk, j*) = -γ1(c1, jk)t(j*) + γ2(c1, jk)L(j*) + γ3(c1, jk)I(j*) + γ4s(c1, jk,
and

*

j ).

u(c2, jk, j*) = -γ1(c2, jk)t(j*) + γ2(c2, jk)L(j*) + γ3(c2, jk)I(j*) + γ4s(c2, jk,

More generally, say now that the court has a docket of n cases. Let D
represent C’s docket—that is, the set of n cases currently pending
before C; D = {c1, c2, c3, . . . , cn}. Then:

240. Judge j* could be pleased with receiving the opinion assignment in the case, or she
might prefer it if another judge had gotten the task. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
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u(ci, jk, j*) = -γ1(ci, jk)t(j*) + γ2(ci, jk)L(j*) + γ3(ci, jk)I(j*) + γ4s(ci, jk, j*)
We may imagine an “assignment function” that maps uniquely from
D to J. A: D → J. A maps each case ci to the judge—say j*–who will
write the opinion in ci: A(ci) = j*. Then, from the perspective of judge jk,
the total utility across all cases in ci 0 D is

U(jk) =

Σ

u(ci, jk, A(ci))

ci 0 D

If judge jk is the assigning judge for all cases ci 0 D, then jk should
assign cases—and in so doing define the function A—such that her
utility is maximized. However, she must do so subject to the
institutional constraint of approximate parity in number of cases
assigned to each judge. Let A-1 be the inverse of the assignment function
A. Then A-1(jl) represents the set of all cases for which the assignment
function A assigns to judge jl to write the opinion. The institutional
constraint is that each judge must bear responsibility for approximately
the same number of opinions, i.e., that | A-1(ji)| ≈ n/m.
Now say that responsibility for opinion assignment is not vested in a
single judge jk. For example, on many courts—including the Supreme
Court—responsibility for opinion assignment lies with the senior
ranking judge who belongs to the majority coalition, with the chief
judge having the highest rank by virtue of that position. Let R be the
function that determines the right to assign the opinion-writing
responsibility in all cases. Like A, R: D → J. For any case ci, R returns
the judge, say j’, who has the power to choose who drafts the opinion in
ci.
I assume, as it is almost universally the case, that the function R is
set by court rule, and therefore for model purposes is exogenously
given. Because the function R determines who assigns responsibility for
drafting opinions in all cases on the court’s docket, it in effect
determines the assignment function A. A couple of examples will
illustrate the point.
For the Supreme Court, opinion assignment rests with the seniormost Justice in the majority coalition—with the Chief Justice de facto
the senior-most Justice whenever he or she is part of that coalition.241
Practically, then, responsibility for the assignment of drafting the
opinion in most cases falls to one of two Justices—the Chief Justice and
241. See SEGAL & SPAETHsupra note 1, at 368 (discussing the Supreme Court opinion
assignment process).
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next-most-senior (or maybe most senior of the opposition bloc). For
simplicity, we may initially assume that assignment falls just to two
judges—j1 and j2. Let R-1(jk) denote the set of all cases ci 0 D, such that
R(ci) = jk. Then j1 and j2 together determine the assignment function A.
Judge j1 will define “his part” of the utility function so as to maximize
max

Σ

u(ci, j1, A(ci)).

ci 0 R-1(j1)

And Judge j2 will define “her part” of the utility function so as to
maximize
max

Σ

u(ci, j2, A(ci)).

ci 0 R-1(j2)

Both judges’ assignments remain subject to the overall approximate
parity constraint.
More generally, say that more than two judges are responsible for
assigning opinion drafting responsibilities for cases on the docket. Let r
denote that subset of judges who enjoy opinion assignment
responsibility with respect to at least one case on the docket, i.e., r f J
such that jk 0 r Ù jk 0 R(D).
Then each judge in r will assign cases—and thus define the overall
assignment function A—so as to maximize his utility under “his
portion” of the assignment function. In other words, the assignment
function will be defined—subject to institutional constraint—as the
function that achieves the following maxima:
max
jk 0 r

Σ

u(ci, jk, A(ci)),

ci 0 R-1(jk)

or in expanded form,
max

Σ

jk 0 r ci 0 R-1(jk)

-γ1(ci, jk)t(A(ci)) + γ2(ci, jk)L(A(ci)) + γ3(ci, jk)I(A(ci)) + γ4s(ci, jk,
A(ci)).

(1)

To this point, I have assumed that the court C hears all cases en
banc. In fact, many courts—including federal courts of appeals—hear
cases in panels.242 Introducing panels to the model is not overly
242. See Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, Local Control of the Bureaucracy: Federal
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complicated. The determination of the assignment function A works
substantially as above, and relies upon the same maximization
requirements.243
B. Opinion Assignment and Case Type
Now let us think about categories of cases, and how they might
impact the maximization requirements that define the assignment
function. Ideological cases are likely to produce values of the various
weighting factors (the γr) that vary greatly across judges. Ideologically
minded judges will be likely to weight the ideological value factor
heavily—although whether a judge weights these factors positively or
negatively will depend upon whether the judge is of like, or opposite,
ideology to the authoring judge. Also, there may be judges who tend to
be less ideological, and to believe that cases (even ideologically charged
ones) ought to be decided in accord with the rule of law. These judges
may assign comparatively little weight to the ideological factor, and
instead may give more weight to the legal factor. These differences will,
in turn, also feed vastly different values for s—the feelings of the other
judges on the court.
In contrast, one can rationally expect the weighting of factors to be
more uniform across judges with respect to nonideological cases—i.e.,
cases in nonideological areas that do not raise salient issues. Here, even
ideological judges are likely to weight the ideological factor far less
than they do the legal factor. In addition, to the extent that the legal
factor dominates, it seems that these cases will appeal to judges of all
stripes as cases that ought to be decided with common weight for the
legal factor. (Indeed, even if judges disagree as to the outcome that “the
law” dictates or suggests, they are still likely to agree that the case
should be decided in accordance with governing law.) As a simplifying
Appeals Courts, Ideology, and the Internal Revenue Service, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 233,
242–43 (2003) (“[F]ederal courts of appeals typically hear cases in randomly assigned threejudge panels.”).
243. Consider federal courts of appeals that typically hear cases in panels of three judges
who are selected at random. The function P maps cases onto J x J x J: P(ci) = {P1(ci), P2(ci),
P3(ci)}. One judge on the panel—usually the senior-most judge (with the chief judge de facto
having the most seniority if he or she is on the panel)—assigns the opinion, and the recipient
must be a panel member. Thus, R and A now map not from D → J, but from
D→

c

P(ci).

ci 0 D
The same maximization conditions define the assignment function A as in the non-panel setting.
Once again, r is the set of judges who enjoy opinion assignment responsibility in at least one
case on the court’s docket, and R-1(jk) is the set of all cases as to which judge jk enjoys such
responsibility.
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assumption, I assume that, at least in cases that fall squarely within this
category, the weight of the ideological factor—γ3—will be zero. I also
assume that the weight of time taken to draft the opinion in the case and
the weight of the legal factor—γ1 and γ2—will be substantially the same
across judges. Finally, I assume—again unlike for ideological cases—
that s will also be uniform across all judges, i.e., that, insofar as feelings
about authorship are likely to be largely homogenous, so too will be the
value of judges’ reactions to having a particular judge author the
opinion in the case.
C. Opinion Assignment in Nonideological Cases on ErrorCorrecting Courts
There are several aspects of condition (1) that likely will hold when
an error-correcting court decides a predominantly nonideological case. I
make several simplifying assumptions to allow conclusions to be more
easily drawn.
First, there is a strong likelihood that γ3—the weight judges assign to
ideological benefit—will be very small. I assume it will be zero.
Second, the weights judges assign to the time it takes to draft an
opinion and to the legal benefit an opinion will offer—γ1 and γ2—will
likely be largely uniform across assigning judges, at least with respect
to categories of like cases. I assume that they will be the same, i.e., that
they will be constants.
Last, it will also likely be the case that s—the aggregate utility of the
judges other than the assigning judge—will not vary substantially. I
assume that it will not vary at all. Thus, even if different assigning
judges weight other judges’ utility differently, i.e., have different values
for γ4, the product γ4(c1, jk)s(c1, jk, j*) will be constant for any given
assigning judge jk and cases within a category. It will not matter which
judge receives the opinion assignment.244
These conclusions—as amplified by the simplifying assumptions—
allow a reduction in the maxima requirement (1) that defines the court’s
assignment function in these cases thus:
max
jk 0 r´

Σ

ci 0 R-1(jk)

-K1t(A(ci)) + K2L(A(ci)) + K3,

where K1, K2, and K3 are constants, and r´ is the set of judges who
assign the opinion in all nonideological cases. The institutional parity244. One exception to this might arise if the judge to whom a certain kind of case would
tend to be assigned is also the assigning judge—for example, if the judge with expertise in a
relevant area is also the chief judge, and therefore always enjoys the opinion-assignment
prerogative. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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of-opinion-assignment requirement continues to apply.
If that is true, then a choice by jk to assign case ci to judge j* that
tends both to make t(j*) very small and also to make L(j*) very large will
contribute toward achieving the desired maximum. As explained in
Section II.A, expertise-based opinion assignment will fit this bill.
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APPENDIX B: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Note: For all tables, * denotes p < 0.10, ** denotes p < 0.05, and
*** denotes p < 0.01.
TABLE B1: Circuit Judges with Prior Experience as Bankruptcy Judges
Senior
Circuit
Judge
Years in Service

Appointed to Court

Status

as Bankruptcy

of Appeals by

Dates of Service as

Cir.

Name of Judge

Judge

President

Circuit Judge

Taken as
of:

1

Conrad K. Cyr

1973–1981245

G. H.W. Bush

11/20/1989–Present

1/31/1997

6

Alice M. Batchelder

1983–1985246

G. H.W. Bush

12/2/1991–Present

--

6

R. Guy Cole, Jr.

1987–1993247

W. Clinton

12/26/1995–Present

--

6

Bernice B. Donald

1988–1995248

B. Obama

9/8/2011–Present

--

8

Michael J. Melloy

1986–1992249

G.W. Bush

2/14/2002–Present

--

10

John C. Porfilio

1975–1982250

R. Reagan

5/10/1985–Present

10/15/1999

245. Judge Cyr’s years as a bankruptcy judge includes years—prior to the 1978 Bankruptcy
Reform Act—when bankruptcy judges were called “bankruptcy referees.” During 1980 and
1981, he also served as chief judge of the First Circuit’s bankruptcy appellate panel. See supra
notes 219–220 and accompanying text. Judge Cyr also served as a federal district judge from
1981 to 1989. See Judge Cyr Biography, supra note 155.
246. Judge Batchelder also served as a federal district judge from 1985 to 1992.
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Batchelder, Alice Moore, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=116&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr.
2, 2014).
247. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Cole, R[ansey] Guy Jr., FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=473&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr.
2, 2014).
248. Judge Donald also served as a federal district judge from 1995 to 2011. Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges: Donald, Bernice Bouie, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/
servlet/nGetInfo?jid=631&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 2, 2014).
249. Judge Melloy also served as a federal district judge from 1992 to 2002. Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges: Melloy, Michael Joseph, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1616&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Apr. 2, 2014).
250. Judge Porfilio (then known as Judge Moore) also served as a federal district judge
from 1982 to 1985. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Porfilio, John Carbone, FED.
JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1915&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last
visited Apr. 2, 2014).
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TABLE B2: Federal Criminal Cases Where Judge Wilkins Was Part of
the Majority, by Year
Year

Number of Cases

1990

20

1991

16

1992

16

1993

15
Total

67

Number (Percentage) of Opinions
Authored by Judge Wilkins
12
(60.00)
11
(68.75)
11
(68.75)
7
(46.67)
41
(61.19)

TABLE B3: Sentencing Guidelines Cases Where Judge Wilkins Was
Part of the Majority, by Year
Year

Number of Cases

1990

15

1991

11

1992

9

1993

7
Total

42

Number (Percentage) of Opinions
Authored by Judge Wilkins
10
(66.67)
9
(81.82)
7
(77.78)
4
(57.14)
30
(71.43)

TABLE B4: Federal Criminal Cases Where Judge Breyer Was Part of
the Majority, by Year
Year

Number of Cases

1990

43

1991

55

1992

36

1993

30
Total

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
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Number (Percentage) of Opinions
Authored by Judge Breyer
13
(30.23)
22
(40.00)
14
(38.89)
12
(40.00)
61
(37.20)
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TABLE B5: Sentencing Guidelines Cases Where Judge Breyer Was
Part of the Majority, by Year
Year

Number of Cases

1990

14

1991

24

1992

17

1993

20
Total

75

Number (Percentage) of Opinions
Authored by Judge Breyer
6
(42.86)
13
(54.17)
7
(41.18)
8
(40.00)
34
(45.33)

TABLE B6: Summary of Data Collected in Primary Bankruptcy
Databases

Circuit

Total Number of Cases

1

64

6

121

8

21

10

139
Total

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/3

345

Number (Percentage) of Cases in which a
Former Bankruptcy Judge Wrote the
Majority Opinion
49
(76.56)
53
(43.80)
13
(61.90)
68
(48.92)
183
(53.04)
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Year

1993

1994

1998

2005

1988

Circuit

1

6

6

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
8

10

23

15251

16

20

0.341

0.250

0.250

0.313

11

5

5

Cole

Melloy

Porfilio

0.273

0.273

0.214

15

Batchelder

Batchelder

0.538

14

0.391

Actual Ratio of
Cases Where a
Judge is on the
Panel: Total
Number of
Cases

Actual
Number
of Cases
Where
Judge in
Question
is on
Panel

9

Cyr

0.188

0.429

Judge in
Question

0.453

0.673

0.335

0.036*

0.019*

0.283

p-value
from
Binomial
Test
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10

10

44

28

6

Expected Ratio
of Cases Where
a Judge is on
the Panel: Total
Number of
Cases

2014]

13

Number of
Bankr. Cases

Number of
Non-Senior
Circuit Judges

TABLE B7: Results of Tests for Disproportionate Assignment of Cases to Former Bankruptcy Judges
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251. I included as a non-senior judge Ralph Guy, who assumed senior status on September
1, 1994. Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Guy, Ralph B. Jr., FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=931&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr.
2, 2014).
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10

1990

0.273

0.273

40

112

0.230

0.263

Cases

Number of

Panel: Total

Judge is on the

Cases Where a

Actual Ratio of

0.915

0.697

Test

Binomial

p-value from

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

appeals

174 Guidelines

criminal appeals

Panel

Number of Cases

426 federal

Question is on

Panel: Total

252

Judge in

Judge is on the

of Cases Where

Actual Number

Judges

Expected Ratio of
Cases Where a

Number of Cases

Senior Circuit

Number of Non-
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1990

Year

TABLE B8: Results of Tests for Disproportionate Assignment of Cases
to Judge Wilkins
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252. I did not include Judge Niemeyer, who became a circuit judge on August 7, 1990.
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Niemeyer, Paul Victor, FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1766&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited
Apr. 2, 2014).
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255.
256.
257.
258.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
Year

1993

1994

1998

2005
1988

Cir.

1

6

6

8
10

Where

10 (66.67)

4 (36.36)

15

11

Batchelder

Cole
Melloy
Porfilio

19 (43.18)

9 (45.00)
3 (18.75)

20
16

1 (0.200)

2 (0.400)

1.000258

1.000257

0.731256

0.024**255

0.669254

0.678253

p-value
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5

5

6 (66.67)

44

9
Batchelder

13 (56.52)

5 (35.71)

Curiam

Decided Per

on Panel

in Question is

23

14

on Panel

Question is

Judge in

Cyr

Judge in Question

of Cases
Where Judge

8 (28.57)

Per Curiam

Decided

Cases

Cases

No. (%age)

28

Cases

No. of Bankr.

of Bankr.

No. of

2014]

No. (%age)

TABLE B9: Results of Tests for Disproportionate Issuance of Per Curiam Opinions When former
Bankruptcy Judge Was on Panel
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Fisher’s exact test.
Fisher’s exact test.
Chi-squared test.
Fisher’s exact test.
Fisher’s exact test.
Fisher’s exact test.
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TABLE B10: Results of Tests for Disproportionate Issuance of Per
Curiam Opinions When Judge Wilkins Was on Panel

Year

1990

1990

No. of Cases
426 federal
criminal
appeals
174
Guidelines
appeals

No.
(%age) of
Cases
Decided
Per
Curiam

Number of
Cases Where
Judge in
Question is on
Panel

Number (%age) of
Cases Where Judge
in Question is on
Panel Decided Per
Curiam

p-value

348
(81.69)

112

91
(81.25)

0.888259

130
(74.71)

40

25
(62.50)

0.043260

TABLE B11: Assignment of All Fourth Circuit Cases Decided in 1991
Where Judge Wilkins Was on the Panel
Panel A: Comparing Federal Criminal Cases

Cases in which Judge
Wilkins was assigned
the opinion
Cases in which Judge
Wilkins was not
assigned the opinion
Total

Appeals from
Federal Convictions

Cases Other than Appeals
from Federal Convictions

Total

11

11

22

6
17

25
36

31
53

Chi-Square = 5.54 [p = 0.019].
Panel B: Comparing Guidelines Cases
Cases in which Judge
Wilkins was assigned
the opinion
Cases in which Judge
Wilkins was not
assigned the opinion
Total

Guidelines Cases
9

Non-Guidelines Cases
13

Total
22

3

28

31

12

41

53

Chi-Square = 7.17 [p = 0.007].

259. Chi-squared test.
260. Chi-squared test.
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TABLE B12: Assignment of All First Circuit
Opinions Decided in 1991
Panel A: Comparing Federal Criminal Cases
Appeals from Federal
Convictions

Cases Other than
Appeals from Federal
Convictions

Total

22

21

43

33
55

59
80

92
135

Cases in which Judge
Breyer was assigned
the opinion
Cases in which Judge
Breyer was not
assigned the opinion
Total

Chi-Square = 2.84 [p = 0.092].
Panel B: Comparing Guidelines Cases
Guidelines Cases

Non-Guidelines Cases

Total

13

30

43

11
24

81
111

92
135

Cases in which Judge
Breyer was assigned
the opinion
Cases in which Judge
Breyer was not
assigned the opinion
Total

Chi-Square = 6.70 [p = 0.010].
TABLE B13: Assignment of Opinions to
Former Bankruptcy Judges

Circuit

Total Number of
Cases

1

64

6

121

8

21

10

139

Total

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

345

Number (Percentage) of
Cases in which a Former
Bankruptcy Judge Wrote the
Majority Opinion
49
(76.56)
53
(43.80)
13
(61.90)
68
(48.92)
183
(53.04)

p-value from
Binomial Test
< 0.01***
0.11
< 0.01***
< 0.01***
< 0.01***
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TABLE B14: Assignment of Opinions to Former Bankruptcy Judges
on the Sixth Circuit (counting any cases where at least one former
bankruptcy judge Was in the majority)

Judge

Total Number of Cases
Where Judge in Question
Was the Lone Former
Bankruptcy Judge

Batchelder

76

Cole

49

Number (Percentage) of
Cases in which the Judge
Wrote the Majority
Opinion
30
(39.47)
23
(46.94)

p-value from
Binomial Test
0.16
0.03**

TABLE B15: Assignment of Opinions to Former Bankruptcy Judges
on the Sixth Circuit (counting any cases where at most one former
bankruptcy judge was in the majority)

Judge

Total Number of Cases
Where Judge in Question
Was the Lone Former
Bankruptcy Judge in the
Majority

Batchelder

72

Cole

45

Number (Percentage) of
Cases in which the Judge
Wrote the Majority
Opinion
30
(41.67)
19
(42.22)

p-value from
Binomial Test
0.08*
0.13

TABLE B16: Assignment of Opinions to Former Bankruptcy Judges
on the Sixth Circuit (Cumulative)

Cases
Included:
All cases
All cases,
except those
where both
judges were in
the majority

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss4/3

Total Number of Cases
Where Judge in Question
Was the Lone Former
Bankruptcy Judge in the
Majority
121

Number (Percentage)
of Cases in which the
Judge Wrote the
Majority Opinion
53
(43.81)

117

47
(41.88)

p-value from
Binomial Test
0.01***

0.03**
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TABLE B17: Assignment of All Fourth Circuit Opinions Decided
in 1988 Where Judge Wilkins Was on the Panel
Appeals from Federal
Convictions

Cases other than
Appeals from Federal
Convictions

Total

6

17

23

8
14

44
61

52
75

Cases in which
Judge Wilkins
was assigned the
opinion
Cases in which
Judge Wilkins
was not assigned
the opinion
Total

Fisher’s exact: p = 0.339.
TABLE B18: Assignment of all First Circuit Opinions Decided in
1988 Where Judge Breyer Was on the Panel
Appeals from Federal
Convictions

Cases other than
Appeals from Federal
Convictions

Total

8

29

37

24
32

58
87

82
119

Cases in which
Judge Breyer was
assigned the
opinion
Cases in which
Judge Breyer was
not assigned the
opinion
Total

Chi-Square = 0.76 [p = 0.384].
TABLE B19: Assignment of Guidelines Opinions to Judge Wilkins,
According to Guidelines Headnote Ratio

Cases in which
Judge Wilkins
was assigned the
opinion
Cases in which
Judge Wilkins
was not assigned
the opinion
Total

Ratio ≤
0.3333

0.3333 < Ratio ≤
0.6667

0.6667 <
Ratio

Total

8

6

16

30

1
9

2
8

9
25

12
42

Fisher’s exact: p = 0.411.
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TABLE B20: Assignment of Guidelines Opinions to Judge Breyer,
According to Guidelines Headnote Ratio

Cases in
which Judge
Breyer was
assigned the
opinion
Cases in
which Judge
Breyer was
not assigned
the opinion
Total

Ratio ≤ 0.3333

0.3333 < Ratio ≤
0.6667

0.6667 < Ratio

Total

6

8

20

34

14
20

14
22

13
33

41
75

Chi-squared = 5.7177 [p = 0.057*].
TABLE B21: Assignment of Bankruptcy Opinions to Former
Bankruptcy Judges, According to Bankruptcy Headnote Ratio

Cases in
which a
former
Bankruptcy
Judge was
assigned the
opinion
Cases in
which Judge
Breyer was
not assigned
the opinion
Total

Ratio ≤ 0.3333

0.3333 < Ratio ≤
0.6667

0.6667 < Ratio

Total

20

28

135

183

37
57

22
50

103
238

162
345

Chi-squared = 8.8472 [p = 0.012**].
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TABLE B22: Assignment of Opinions in Federal Criminal Cases, and
Guidelines Cases, to Judge Wilkins, Broken Down by Party of the
President who Appointed the Assigning Judge
Cases Assigned by Judges
Cases Assigned by Judges
Appointed by Democratic
Appointed by Republican Presidents
Presidents
No. (%age)
No. (%age) of
of Cases
Cases
p-value from
Assigned to
Total
Total
Assigned to
Binomial
Judge
p-value from Cases
Cases
Test
Wilkins Binomial Test Assigned Judge Wilkins
Type of Cases Assigned
Federal
Criminal
18
23
Cases
30
(60.00)
< 0.01***
32
(62.16)
< 0.01***
Guidelines
11
19
Cases
16
(68.75)
< 0.01***
26
(73.08)
< 0.01***

p-value

0.857261
0.515262

261. Chi-squared test.
262. Fisher’s exact test.
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TABLE B23: Assignment of Opinions to Former Bankruptcy Judges,
Broken Down by Party of the President who Appointed the Assigning
Judge
Cases Assigned by Judges Appointed
by Democratic Presidents

Cases Assigned by Judges Appointed
by Republican Presidents

Judge

Total
Cases
Assigned

p-value
from
Binomial
Test

Total Cases
Assigned

Cyr

11

0.038*

53

Batchelder

21

0.580

55

Cole

33

0.176

16

Melloy

1

0.0333

20

Porfilio

59

< 0.01***

80

Total

125

< 0.01***

224

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

No. (%age) of
Cases
Assigned to a
Former
Bankruptcy
Judge
7
(63.64)
7
(33.33)
14
(42.42)
1
(100.00)
32
(54.24)
61
(41.19)

No. (%age)
of Cases
Assigned to a
Former
Bankruptcy
Judge
42
(79.25)
23
(41.82)
9
(56.25)
12
(60.00)
36
(45.00)
122
(55.20)

p-value
from
Binomial
Test

pvalue

< 0.01***

0.27263

0.117

0.50264

0.050**

0.36265

0.013**

1.00266

0.020**

0.28267

< 0.01***

0.28268

Fisher’s exact test.
Chi-squared test.
Chi-squared test.
Fisher’s exact test.
Chi-squared test.
Chi-squared test.
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Cases

Guidelines

Cases

and SelfAssigned

was

Senior-

0.65

Assignments

Most Opinion

of Senior-

Middle

was

Wilkins

Judge

where

2

1 (50.00)

0.56

32

49

Senior-Most

Wilkins

2 (33.33)

Wilkins was

Judge

Cases

Total

6

Where Judge

Where

Binomial test

p-value for

Judge

of Cases

Cases

Most

No. (%age)

Total

23 (71.88)

32 (65.31)

Opinion

and Wrote

Middle Judge

Wilkins was

where Judge

of Cases

No. (%age)

<0.01

<0.01

Assignments

Opinion

Middle Judge

Binomial test of

P-value for

8

12

Most

Junior-

was

Wilkins

Judge

where

Cases

Total

6 (75.00)

7 (58.33)

Opinion

and Wrote

Junior-Most

Wilkins was

where Judge

of Cases

No. (%age)

0.02

0.07

Assignments

Opinion

Junior-Most

test of

Binomial

p-value for

0.084

0.34

p-value for
Fisher’s
Exact Test
for Opinion
Assignment
Across
Panel
Hierarchies

2014]

Fed. Crim.

Type of Case

Hierarchical Panel Position

Assignment of Opinions to Judge Wilkins, Broken Down by
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Total Cases where
Former Bankr. Judge
was Senior-Most

11

34

6

59

110

Cir

1

6

8

10

Total

24 (36.92)

5 (62.50)

35 (47.95)
84 (48.00)

65

8

73
177

<0.01

<0.01

<0.01
<0.01

<0.01

<0.01

0.02

0.22

<0.01

22 (70.97)

31

<0.01

38 (64.29) <0.01

58

0.05
4 (57.14)

7

0.17
3 (42.86)

11 (50.00) 0.03

22

7

20 (90.91) <0.01

0.50

0.96

0.38

0.25

0.12

No. (%age) p-value for
p-value for Chiof Cases
Binomial test Squared Test for
where
of Junior-Most Opinion Assmt.
Former
Across Panel
Opinion
Bankr.
Hierarchies
Assmts
Judge was
Junior-Most
and Wrote
Opinion

22

Total
Cases
where
Former
Bankr.
Judge
was
Junior –
Most

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

59 (53.64)

29 (49.15)

5 (83.33)

18 (52.94)

p-value for
Binomial test of
Middle Judge
Opinion Assmts

Total Cases
No. (%age) of
where Former Cases where
Bankr. Judge was Former Bankr.
Middle Judge
Judge was
Middle Judge
and Wrote
Opinion

p-value for
Binomial test of
Senior-Most
Opinion Assmts

1684

7 (63.64)

No. (%age) of Cases
where Former Bankr.
Judge was SeniorMost and SelfAssigned

TABLE B25: Assignment of Opinions to Former Bankruptcy Judges, Broken Down by Hierarchical Panel Position
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